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Quand la rhétorique est une dame:
L’identité rhétorique et la représentation shakespearienne des personnages
féminins
—Résumé--
Cette thèse explore le concept de «l’identité rhétorique» dans la représentation de la
femme dans l’oeuvre shakespearienne. Au début de la Renaissance les femmes étaient
soumises aux normes sociopolitiques de silence, de chasteté, et d’obéissance; pourtant
les pièces de Shakespeare regorgent de femmes rhétoriques. Immanquablement, la
femme shakespearienne défie toutes contraintes à sa liberté d’action et à sa liberté
d’expression, et atteint une force qui lui permet d’avoir un rayonnement sur l’art et sur
la culture.
Si l’on considère que chacune des pièces de Shakespeare forme une société de
personnages fondée sur le langage, il s’avère nécessaire de déterminer la tolérance de
cette société aux constructions rhétoriques qui lui sont propres. Comme soliloque
féminine, la chanson et le silence sont de façon notoirement capables de déstabiliser les
mondes dramatiques et de déterminer la destinée de leurs habitants. Les personnages
shakespeariens de sexe féminin ne peuvent pas demeurer intacts et en effet ne resteront
pas intacts étant donné leurs tendances langagières. Dans les tragédies, ces femmes
meurent, tandis que dans les comédies, elles arrivent à survivre grâce à un travestisme
carnavalesque. La femme rhétorique ne peut tout simplement pas survivre à la moralité
de la Renaissance à moins qu’elle ne la transcende.
La théorie de l’identité rhétorique crée un domaine fécond pour la critique du
personnage féminin - un domaine dans lequel on peut discuter des femmes
shakespeariennes en termes de leurs rapports exceptionnels avec leur propre rhétorique.
En portant son attention sur leurs réussites, échecs et ambiguïtés rhétoriques par rapport
aux structures dramatiques, ces femmes ne se définissent plus par le biais d’autres
personnages, ni ne se construisent-elles leurs propres caractères en s’appropriant un
discours rhétorique. Plutôt elles adoptent une identité rhétorique dans laquelle les
personnages sont, en réalité, leurs propres mots.
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When Rhetoric Is a Lady:
Rhetorical Identity and Shakespearean Female Characterization
— Abstract
My Master’s thesis in Shakespeare explores the notion of “rhetorical identity” in
its characterization ofthe Shakespearean female. Women, in Early Modem England,
were expected to adhere to socio-political prescriptions of silence, chastity, and
obedience; yet, rhetorical women abound in Shakespearean drama. The Shakespearean
female consistently defies constraints upon her speech and actions, and achieves a
potency that allows her to resound in art and culture.
If each Shakespearean play is a language-based character society, it becomes
neccssary to determine that society’s tolerance to its own rhetorical constructions. As
female soliloquy, song and silence are notoriously capable ofdestabilizing dramatic
worlds and determining the fates of their inhabitants, Shakespearean female characters
cannot and do flot remain intact given their transgressive speech tendencies. In the
tragedies, they die, while in the comedies, they are preserved only by camivalesque
transvestism. The rhetorical woman simply cannot survive Renaissance morality
— that
is, unless she transcends it.
The theory of rhetorical identity opens up a unique space for female character
criticism
— one in which we may discuss Shakespeare’s wornen in terms oftheir
exceptional relationships with their own rhetoric. By focusing on their rhetorical
successes, failures and ambiguities in relation to dramatic structures, these women are
no longer defined by other characters, nor do they construct their own characters
through the appropriation of rhetorical agency. Instead, they assume rhetorical identity,
according to which their characters in fact are their own words.
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Fig. 1. “Rhetorica” [Lady Rhetoric] from Gregor Reisch, Margarita Philosophica (Freiburg, 1503);
reproduced from the Collections ofthe Library ofCongress (Washington, DC); rpt. in Carole Levin
and Patricia A. Sullivan, eUs., Potitical Rhetoric, Power, and Renaissance Women (Albany: State U
ofNY p, 1995) y.
Whcn Rhetoric Ii * Lady:
Rhetodcal Idenftty net Shakespeanan Peinte Chancterbafion
Introduction —
An outspoken Renaissance woman was an unruly Renaissance woman, both in
art and in life. Jane Donawerth explains that the “gender role assigned to women in
Renaissance Europe” was such that “appropriating rhetoric was a particularly radical
thing to do. The ideal woman was ‘chaste, suent, and obedient,’ to the point that she did
flot study the art of rhetoric” (265-6). To illustrate her argument, Donawerth presents
several Early Modem woodcuts found in Gregor Reisch’s encyclopedia Margurita
Philosophica (1503), and examines attributes ofthe depicted figures as they signify this
“cultural restriction” (266):
Lady Grammar [“Typus Gramatio,” not included]... is a modest
womanly figure, with her hair done up under a cap, and a sober gown up
to her neck; ... she is the sort of woman humanists would like their
daughters to grow up to be.... Lady Rhetoric [“Rhetorica,” Figure 1]’
is not an appropriate mode! for daughters: her hair is waved and flowing
loose over her shoulders, her low-necked gown is made of extravagant
pattemed brocade, and the circle of famous rhetors surrounding ber
openly admire her theatricality; she is anything but modest. (Donawerth
266)
Remarkab!y, this representation of Lady Rhetoric supports the argument of this thesis in
both symbolic and materiaÏ ways. On the one hand, the drawing graphically portrays the
paradox that inspired this inquiry: that of the double-edged “sword of rhetoric” which
itself signifies both the art ofthe rhetorica! female and the societal threat against her. On
the other, this actualization of a concept of Lady Rhetoric reinforces, quite literally and
fortuitously, the greater purpose of the project: to theorize and characterize the
rhetorical Shakespearean female as a transcendent and everlasting “image of speech.”
Figuratively speaking, as Donawerth suggests, the Reisch engraving imagines
the female rhetorician as an undignified and wanton woman, and mirrors the prevailing
Fig. I. “Rhetorica” [Lady Rhetoric] from Gregor Reisch, Margarita Philosophica (Freiburg, I 5O3) reproduced from
the CoUections ofthe Libraty of Congress (Washington, DC). See page ix.
3Renaissance anxiety that “if a woman opened her mmd and opened her mouth, she
might very weII choose to open herseif in other ways” (266). In keeping with that
negative characterization, the image also suggests a very punitive response to female
speech (and its coextensive sexuality) in its inclusion of the flower, growing out of one
side of Lady Rhetoric’s mouth, which tbreatens to be cut off by the large sword entering
from the other side; can it be her “flowery tongue” that is being removed, as inferred by
what looks like blood running down ber neck? Most importantiy, aside from any and ail
apparent social judgments, the illustration features a variety of names and terms that are
central to humanist leaming. In between the Latin words historia, poesis, moralia,
naturas, and Leges (“history,” “poetry,” “moral philosophy,” “nature,” and “Law”)
which are inscribed upon books around Lady Rhetoric, and the names of famous and
ancient rhetoricians Seneca and Aristotle which appear on the mortared walls beside
her, is the word musa — written across her bare lower neck. As the labels and their
positions in this image point to their greater functions — with books and bricks as the
tools and foundations of the hurnanist school of thought — Lady Rhetoric’s
classification, translated into the English “Muse” (“muse, n.”), confers upon her a more
significant power and duty than that of being a “cautionary tale” for young Renaissance
women. Afier ail there can be no underestimating the impact that a goddess of arts,
possessing such “theatricality” (a term which suggests both lier performative and
dramatic properties), would have had on the superior imagination of one William
Shakespeare. Indeed, this ambivalent representation in its entirety speaks for the
prevalence of expert female orators in Shakespeare’s plays, who were clearly
4considered and dramatically represented as both exceptional and transgressive, both
captivating and consequential during his time — and beyond it.
Given the contradictory nature of Lady Rhetoric, this thesis is concerned with
understanding lier complexity, her influence, and her fate as it is ultimately determined
for lier by social forces and theatrical standards, and with devising and applying a
methodology of Shakespearean female characterization that theoretically frees the
character from her traditional prescriptions of censure, blame and death. My central
argument is that if we consider a character’s own personal rhetoric and the effects of
that language as entirely constitutive of her identity, then that figure is relieved of the
critical burden of drarnatic context without undennining the structural significance of
that context. Each and every Shakespearean character possesses a rhetorical identity that
has been purposefully crafted by Shakespeare himself, and this project is aimed at
exploring the importance of that linguistic phenomenon in its creation of potent and
lasting images ofwomen in literature and culture.
Whether or not Shakespeare ever saw Reisch’s illustration of Lady Rhetoric, lie
was undoubtedly taken with the notion of the expert female orator. Lady Rhetoric
abounds in Shakespearean drama. Karen Newman inadvertently explains lier
widespread presence by asserting that, in the absence of any overarching narrative,
“[c]haracter is required in drama because action requires agents” (1). Newman here
underscores the necessity of characters’ words and actions in the developrnent of a
dramatic plot. Significantly, whenever a prominent female character tums out to be
rhetorically gifted, she lias a massive impact on the course and outcome of her play.
Afier all, can we suppose that Macbeth would have killed Duncan without tlie coaxing
5of an “unsex[ed]” Lady Macbeth (Mac. 1.5.48)? Would Antonio flot have been one
gruesome pound lighter without the “quality” of Portia’ s “mercy” (MV 4.1.190)? Would
Othello have been so quick to love and to condemn Desdemona without lier “downright
violence and storm of fortunes” (Oth. 1 .3.245)?2 0f course, these are just a few farnous
and rather obvious examples of consequential female eloquence in Shakespeare, but
they are enough to command critical attention to the capacity of female rhetoric to
destabilize the social world of a play and determine the fates of its various inhabitants.
Consequently, the critical impulse in treating Shakespeare’s wornen is to focus
on their rhetorical agency, and to gauge their purpose and usefulness in terms of the
effects that their speech has on other characters and on the drarna itself. In 50 doing, we
let them tell us who they are. A very serious problem arises, however. when it cornes
time for social judgments to be made. In Reading Shakespeare ‘s Characters: Rhetoric,
Ethics, and Identity, Christy Desmet explains the moral consequences of “subordinating
character to plot”
— a theory rooted in Aristotle’s Poetics:
Action... is performed by agents who exhibit ethical tendencies that
place them somewhere along a continuum ofvirtue and vice.... When
character is considered as a by-product of plot, drama is closely related
to ethics: Dramatic agents have ethical character so that we may judge
their actions as wejudge men at the end oftheir public lives. (4-6)
The Aristotelian theory of ethical character will be further evaluated in Chapter 1 for its
role in creating the conditions of Lady Rhetoric’s existence. At this point, it is useful in
its suggestion that having broken the rules of appropriate female conduct, Lady
Rhetoric simply cannot win out in the face of Renaissance moral scrutiny. She caimot,
that is, unless she transcends it.
2 AIl Shakespeare quotes have been taken from various, individual editions ofhis plays. Ptease consutt
the Bibliography to reference the specific publications ofthe plays used for this project.
6In an attempt to discuss Lady Rhetoric’s fate and her theoretical escape in more
structural terms, I defer to certain insights found in prior studies on the Rhetoric of
Character. Giorgio Meichiori argues for Shakespeare’s expert creation of an “over-ail,”
play-specific “linguistic structure”
— an “aesthetic whoie” to which ail of the characters
adhere in order to “effectively communicate” the drama (61-2, 71). Meichiori calis this
the “Rhetoric of Character Construction,” indicating how it shapes characters by means
of distinctive and familiar linguistic pafterns (6$) — particulariy without any overarching
narrative that wouid convey specific character qualities and actions (62). Whule this
approach to characterization is rather two-dimensional in its suggestion that a given
character is singularly deflned by its own manners of speech and physical movements
(122), it is nonetheless effective in its advancement of the notion of a ianguage-based
“character society” in each $hakespearean play
— one in which ail characters, for the
sake of action, are complicit in the rhetorical construction of identity. Meichiori also
opens a door to Karen Newman’s expanded notion of “action” as it refers to plot
advancement, and her exploration of the rhetorical devices that serve to deepen a
character by giving it a third dimension — an ‘inner-1ife” with extemal effects (1-2). Her
“Rhetoric of Consciousness” (121) suggests that characters, in speaking of themselves
and examining their own conditions, compel us to explore them beyond their
“syntactical” and “paradigmatic” categories — as motivated, conflicted, developing
persons. (2-4).
If we choose to consider each $hakespearean play as something of a language
based “character society,” it becomes necessary — particularly in the case of female
characters — to determine the integrity of that society, or rather, its tolerance towards its
7own constructions. In other words, we need to figure out who, in that play, actually gets
to be who they say they are. Which characters get to survive and remain intact? While
their rhetoric of choice varies from soliloquy, to song, to silence, rhetorical women in
the tragedies
— including Lady Macbeth, Desdemona, Cleopatra, Tamora, Lavinia,
Cordelia, and Ophelia
— are fated, across the board, to suffer and die for their social and
verbal crimes. In the comedies, female rhetoricians
— including Portia, Viola, and
Rosalind
— are allowed to live happily ever after, but most of their public speaking is
done while disguised as men, and that fact magically serves to excuse them from any
moral scmtiny.
What is required then, in positing a theory of rhetorical identity that supports
and explains the strength of Shakespeare’s female characters, is one figure that provides
a loophole in these dramatic laws
— that is, a comic heroine who speaks and strives to
achieve her own ends, but whose female identity and integrity is neyer hidden or
compromised in that process, and whose character life is flot sacrificcd for any greater
dramatic purpose. Desmet supports this assertion and suggests a solution:
A substantial amount of work has been done on the subversive effects of
cross-dressing in Shakespeare’s plays, but the problem of identification
is most interesting flot in those plays that put their heroines into breeches
but in those featuring female characters who exhibit erotic and verbal
power without changing costume or sexual identity. Venus and Adonis,
Measure for Measure, and Ail ‘s Well That Ends Well ail feature females
who combine sexual appeal with a command oforatory, and ail examine
the unequivocal effect of female rhetoric on men. (137)
Venus and Isabella are indeed two spirited and powerful Shakespearean female
characters, who both manage to withstand the Renaissance paradox of embodying both
eloquence and femininity. One might argue, however, that they are somewhat lacking in
the contextual support that wouid create metadramatic, theoretical possibility out of
8their exceptionality. The mythological content of Venus and Adonis positions that work
and its heroine in a supernatural morality — one that cannot provide a proper standard
for Renaissance judgments. While Measiire for Measure does provide that standard, and
crucially redirect this rhetorical inquiry towards more tragic Shakespearean fernales (in
Chapter 3), the play serves more immediately to trouble prevailing notions of crime and
punishment, with Isabella providing the body and voice of mercy in a revolutionary
challenge to male judicial standards (Desmet 144-5). While all three of the works cited
by Desmet indeed “examine the unequivocal effect of female rhetoric on men,” only
Ail ‘s Well That Ends Well examines the unequivocal effect of male rhetoric on the
female.
While Reisch’s Lady Rhetoric provides a hieroglyphic sort of inspiration for this
project, All’s Well That Ends Well’s Helena provides its central paradigm. Indeed,
Helena represents the theoretical loophole in Lady Rhetoric’s paradoxical condition. I
submit that Helena’s character and ber relationship with language, embodied by the
character Parolles, opens up a unique space for female character criticism — one in
which we may discuss $hakespeare’s more tragic women in terms oftheir extraordinary
relationships with their own rhetoric. In examining the rhetorical successes, failures,
and ambiguities of Shakespearean females, and how they relate to dramatic structures,
we give them critical and theoretical independence from the rhetorical constructions of
their character societies — those that would serve to bind them, and seal their fate in our
imagination. Using this methodology, we create the conditions whereby these women
are no longer defined by other characters, nor are they responsible for constructing their
9own characters through the appropriation of rhetorical agency. Instead, they assume
rhetorical identity, according to which their characters in fact are their own words.
My initial chapter develops my concept of rhetorical identity and the drarnatic
character as a critical hybrid of the following branches of theory: firstly, Aristotelian
dramatic theory, which underscores the inextricable and ethical relationship between
character and plot in tragedy, thus constructing the exceptional rhetorical female as a
tragic device; secondly, Barthesian semiological theory, which emphasizes the essential
functioning of language in the articulation of reality and the self, the primacy and
plurality of the text, and the rhetoric of the image, thus encouraging the concept of the
dramatic character as being solely made up of his or her own speech; and finally,
Modem ldentity theory, which argues for the realignment of the modem moral code
away from theistic definitions and towards more personalized classifications. Charles
Taylor, in Sources ofthe Seif The Making ofModern Identity, posits that “[a] self exists
only within... ‘webs of interlocution” (36) — that is, that identity is defined through
speech relations. In so doing, he enables a theory of dramatic characterization based on
rhetoric, rather than action.
This combined theory is textually advanced, in the remaining chapters of this
thesis, through rhetorical character studies of the outstanding females in certain
Shakespearean tragicomedies and tragedies. Chapters 2 posits Helena as the model of
rhetorical identity, and Chapter 3 examines Isabella as another figure who withstands
the rhetorical-female paradox, but whose more controversial and troubled character
effectively bridges the gap between comic and tragic women and thus encourages the
examination of some of Shakespeare’s most resounding and doomed female characters;
10
the chapter subsequently treats the darker and more provocative identities of Othello’s
Desdemona and of Lady Macbeth, whose eloquence ultimately trumps the issues of
violence and corruption that otherwise define their characters.
Through their various, complex relationships with rhetoric, these four female
characters achieve large and lasting identities that oppose and overpower their dramatic
characterizations as evil, or false, or weak women
— classifications which correspond
directly and ironically to the force and frequency of their speech. Juliet Dusinberre
writes, “the plays of Shakespeare... dramatize worlds in which women are and were
freer beings than the misogyny and disempowerment narrative suggests” (xii). We
canriot go back and save Shakespeare’s tragic women from their required deaths, nor
can we erase the need for his comic women to put away their breeches and restore the
patriarchal moral and social order that subjugates them. We can, however, focus on the
comprehensive rhetorical identities that make these female characters exceptional — in
celebration of their images, their influence, and of the knowledge that Shakespeare is in
charge when rhetoric is a lady.
Chapter 1
Towards a Theory of Rhetorical Identity
12
Language most shewes a man: speake that I may see thee. It springs out
ofthe most retired, and inmost parts of us, and is the Image ofthe Parent
of it, the mmd. No glasse renders a mans forme, or likenesse, so true as
his speech.
Ben Jonson, Discoveries Made Upon Men and Matter, c. 1641
The idea that speech constitutes the man, and substantiates his character, is by
no means a groundbreaking one in terms of Renaissance theory or literary criticism.
Rather, the concept seems to have pervaded Early Modem thought and art to the point
of acquiring commonplace status, both as a socio-cultural assumption and as a critical
subject. The titie page of the 1641 edition of Jonson’s Discoveries, from which the
above epigraph is taken, declares its miscellaneous contents to ‘have flow’d out of
[Jonson’s] daily Readings; or had their refluxe to his peculiar Notion of the Times.”
Jonson’s “peculiar” (contemporarily understood to mean “particular”) conception ofthe
linguisfic formation of the figure of man thus constitutes a remark upon a certain trend
or theme in EarÏy Modem literature, and Jonson’s astute observation and articulation of
a widespread social belief. In positing and constructing a theory of “rhetorical identity”
in relation to Shakespeare’s characters, I endeavor to refocus critical attention upon that
widespread, disregarded notion of verbally-constituted character as it informs, and is
itself enhanced by the generic association between spoken language and character
identity in Early Modem drama. With the goal of explaining a distinct literary
phenomenon
— and flot with a view to any sort of “bardolatry”
— I mean to theorize the
“peculiar” force, vitality, and endurance of Shakespeare’s female characters as both the
function and the proofof Shakespeare’s expert and intentional deployment ofrhetoric in
the construction of character.
13
0f course, the statement and theory that “[l]anguage most shewes the man”
camiot be thought to implicitly include. contain, or account for the identity of the Early
Modem female, as the average woman was rarely seen or heard in public during the age
being remarked upon by Jonson, and indeed during most prior and subsequent periods
in history. Remarkably, both in spite of and because of that reality, women’s rhetorical
theory has become an increasingly popular and relevant focus of study throughout the
past twenty years. In Rhetoric RetoÏd: Regendering the Tradition from Antiqïtlly
Through the Renaissance (1997), which constitutes a “remapping” of the earlier (i.e.
Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance) histories of the practice and discipline of public
speaking, Cheryl Glenn explains that the rhetorical theory attributed to any given
society is indicative of that society’s power structures and, coextensively, its gender
dynamics:
Rhetoric always inscribes the relation of language and power at a
particular moment (including who may speak, who may listen or who
will agree to listen, and what can be said); therefore, canonical rhetorical
theory has presented the experience of males, powerful males, with no
provision or allowance for females. In short, rhetorical history bas
replicated the power politics of gender, with men in the highest cultural
role and social rank. And our view of rhetoric has remained one of a
gendered landscape [...). (1-2)
Recognizing that “women have been closed out of the rhetorical tradition... of vocal,
virile, public... men,” Glenn seeks in her study to “regender” that tradition by locating
female rhetoricians in history and celebrating their cultural contributions (1, 2). Glenn’s
is a feminist, historiographical effort to revise our narrative of human rhetorical
development to include the voices and accomplishments of wornen. In a similar
exercise in theoretical reintegration, Jane Donawerth’s Rhetoricat Theory by Women
before 1900: An Anthology explicitly “documents a great diversity of women’s rhetorics
14
across many cultures... because no women were included in the anthologies of the
rhetorical tradition” (xiii). b account for women’s categorical, historical exclusion
from rhetorical education and public speaking, Donawerth significantly broadens the
definition of the term “rhetoric”
— classically understood and primarlly defined by the
Oxford English Dictionary as “[t]he art of using language [either spoken or written] so
as to persuade or influence others” (“rhetoric, n.1”)
— to encompass “the art of
communication” in ail forms of discourse, including composition and letter writing
(xv). These and other current works and collections have sought to situate and
authenticate the place of women in the male rhetorical tradition, and to retroactively
construct a female tradition by reclaiming the rhetoric(s) of women as their own.1 It is
with the utmost respect for these scholars and their pioneering studies, which are crucial
in underscoring the gender discrepancy in rhetoric, that I position my own rhetorical
theory of Shakespearean female characterization along a very different axis — a
decidediy non-feminist and perhaps even patriarchal one, and thus one which is
necessarily more in keeping with Shakespeare’s time.
I contend that any rhetorical theorization of the Early Modem female
— human
or literary
— must be grounded in the premise that women who engaged in public
speaking were necessarily engaging in a male activity, and trespassing upon male
territory. In lis introduction to Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology (1971), Walter J.
Ong describes that “[r]hetoric at its most impressive peak [in the Renaissance] was
‘In the introduction to her anthology, Donawerth provides a comprehensive Iist ofscholarly
accomplishments in the fleld offeminist rhetorical theory and history, including: Carole Levin and
Patricia A. Sullivan’s Political Rhetoric, Power, and Renaissance Women (1995); Andrea A. Lunsford’s
Reclaiming Rhetorica: Wornen in die Rhetoricat Tradition (1995); Chetyl Glenn’s Rhetoric Retold:
Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the Renaissance (1997); and Christine MasonSutherland and Rebecca Sutcliffe’s The Changing Tradition: Women in the Histoy ofRhetoric (1999)[xiiij.
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heroic and masculinizing through its association with puberty rites” (14). As the third
leg of the Western disciplinary trivium of grammar, rhetoric and logic (or dialectic)
—
which formed the comerstone of the European educational system from 1400 (and
possibÏy earlier) through to 1200
— Renaissance schoolboys, including William
Shakespeare,2 were rigorously instructed in the art of rhetoric using the classical
treatises of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian (Vickers 17; Murphy 3 57-63). Ong
accounts for the systematic exclusion of the women from the studies of rhetoric and
Latin
— a social reality which helped shape the discipline as a masculine form of and
forum for “ceremonial war”:
Until Romanticism matured, rhetoric as a formai discipline was studied
as part ofthe study of Latin... When Latin gradually disappeared and
concomitantly schools began to admit girls, formaI rhetoric also
disappeared... Used only by males and under the sway ofthe old oral
dialectical-rhetorical tradition, Leamed Latin was a ceremonial polemic
instrument which from classical antiquity until the beginriings of
romanticism helped keep the entire academic curriculum programmed as
a form ofritual male combat centered on disputation. (14-15, 17)
Thus, any female appropriation of the art of rhetoric in Early Modem society was
tantamount to her physically wandering beyond the private, domestic sphere to which
she was reiegated, and into the masculine, public reaims of politics and war — it was an
aberration, and a violation of gender-appropriate behavior. For a woman to speak out at
ail, she had to be speaking the language of men. That precept contains, for this and any
thesis, distinct dramatic and Ïiterary significance. as any discussion of the rhetoric of
Shakespeare’s female characters must itself be rooted in the knowledge and recognition
that the female figures in a play are essentially male creations, who speak male-
2 Wiliiam Shakespeare (b.1564 — d.1616) is generally believed to have aftended Stratford-upon-Avon’s
grammar school — the King’s New School — the curricu’um of which was based Iargely on the study of
Latin and the major classical writers (Greenblatt, Will 25-8).
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designated phrases and speeches, and exist and operate according to executive male
decisions and instructions. Indeed. the inherent masculinity of dramatic female speech
is further reinforced and compounded by the fact that female roles were performed by
young boys on the Renaissance stage
— yet another site of public speaking and activity
to which women were barred access.
This project is therefore flot intended to examine Shakespeare’s rhetorical
female characters as being antagonistic towards Eariy Modem male standards and
structures, for how can they be so when they are the embodiment of those male
principles? I am also flot concerned with treating these figures as being outstanding
from Early Modem female typology, for I would argue that the exceptional vibrancy
and ahistoric, metadramatic resonance of Shakespeare’s women speak very much for
themselves
— which is precisely the point. Afier ail, to gauge female rhetorical agency
and its dramatic effects as a measure of female subjectivity is rather futile when that
agency is male-authorized and sanctioned; such a liberal, evaluative process in fact
ensures that female character identity remains forever conditional in its dependence
upon male authorial will and purpose, which we can neyer definitively establish or
prove as being “progressive” or “ferninist.” However, to observe and appraise female
characters according to what they are — that is, their own speech
— is to acknowledge the
male artistic intention behind their distinctive character constructions, and then to
evaluate them individually based on the quality and force oftheir own language. Using
this methodology, character identity is determined through an analysis of that
character’s relationship with his or her own rhetoric, as well as their rhetorical
development and!or disintegration over the course of a play. Ultimately, the great
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benefit of such a reading practice is that it is inclusive, for every single speaking
character necessarily has a rhetorical identity, regardless of their class or gender.
Furthermore, it creates an altemate dimension for the audience/reader/critic’s appraisal
of character. and a formai standard for it, as characters are now assessed flot just
according to who they are or what they do, but for their own rhetorical proficiency —
that is, their respective rhetorical strengths, weaknesses and ambiguities, and how those
serve to reinforce and uphold their individual identities within and beyond their
character societies. If ail rhetoric is male, then gender ceases to be a significant category
or a distinguishing factor in the process of rhetorical characterization — that which
ultimateÏy requires the acceptance or condenmation of any given character based on his
or her own “word.”
Admittedly, if we recail the image and notion of Lady Rhetoric, it becomes
somewhat paradoxical that our theory of rhetorical identity is both gender-inspired and
gender-blind. However, such is the nature of rhetorical identity: it contains its own
theoretical contradictions. Defying any polarizing classification as a “fixed” (core) or
“unstable” (dialectic/diachronic) conception of identity, rhetorical identity in fact
contains both of these modes, or states of being. Rhetorical identity is a process, a
dialogue between the two actions that form it: 1) constitution. which I am arguing is
rhetoricai, and 2) interaction, which occurs when that rhetoric is received and
interpreted by its intended audience. In other words, rhetorical identity theorizes the
manner in which a character is 1) made of language that 2) serves to persuade an
audience to sympathize or empathize with him or her. The OED defines “identity” as
“[t]he quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature,
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properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness;
oneness” (“identity”). We can say, then, that the rhetorical identity of a dramatic
character is “fixed” in the sense that it is aiways made up of the same words, and that it
is also “unstable,” in that its rhetoric necessarily contains its own perlocution, or
potentially persuasive effect.3 In recognizing the maimer in which rhetorical identity is
simultaneously grounded in its own linguistic structure, and also able to be considered
apart from that structure, we move towards an understanding of how the Shakespearean
female character is both dramatically doomed and theoretically free, and how that
theoretical freedom contains both female objectivity and fernale subjectivity. By
reading and assessing Shakespeare’s female figures as rhetorical models, their particular
examples combine to suggest and support a theory of their own creation and persistence
that ultimately serves to re-categorize and degender them. In essence, they become the
key proofs of a much broader rhetorical theory that they themselves establish.
Because they both construct and reflect one another, the rhetorical
Shakespearean female character and the theory of rhetorical identity contain the same
ironie condition: both are simultaneously rooted in structure, and reaching beyond
structure. Consequently, like the Shakespearean female figure, the theory of rhetorical
identity may be considered as one that is built upwards and which extends outwards
from its own solid foundation in the form and structure of drama. The following
chapters of this thesis wilÏ engage in rhetorical character readings of Shakespeare’s
femaÏes which highuight the phenomenon whereby they formally and imaginatively
transcend the male system — the deeply-entrenched organization of social and cultural
Perlocution is one ofthree types of speech acts — along with locution and illoctition — considered by J.L.
Austin in How to do Things with Words, Lecture VIII, p. 101.
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activities and precepts
— that dictates their existence. The rest of this chapter will serve
to erect the theory of rhetorical identity, from the ground up, using a particular set of
methodologies as its building blocks
— from the Aristotelian dramatic principles that
explain its initial conditions, to the Barthesian semiological concepts and theory that
redefine and renegotiate its structural status, to the more modem philosophical
understanding of identity, put forth by Charles Taylor. which provides us with a
contemporary, ideological justification and support for the notion of rhetorical identity.
By recognizing how similar in composition the theory of rhetorical identity and its
corroborating figures are, we begin to see how their association serves to theoretically
liberate the female character by lifting her up and out of the male scheme that confines
her and condemns her for her social and verbal transgressions.
At the heart of this study is the generic regulation that the rhetorical fernale
character is not permitted to persist or to survive as such in Shakespearean drama; as a
matter of literary and dramatic fact, to be a rhetorically-gifted fernale in a
Shakespearean tragedy is a crime punishable by death. The question is. why? Why was
it necessary for Shakespeare, who so vividly imagined and rendered expert female
orators, to ultimately negate those representations? A practical and relatively sound
explanation is that Shakespeare, in order to ensure the popularity and the fiscal success
of his plays, was bound to please and/or appease his Early Modem viewers by always
upholding, in the end, their basic social values. In other words, a rhetorical female
character was a thrill, but not a threat, as long as she was put in lier place — or rather,
silenced
— at the end of the play. Taking Shakespeare’s contractual obligation to satisfy
his audience one step further, I would suggest that the lifting up and cutting down of a
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rhetorical female character would have been an inherently spectacular and tragic event;
that is, it would have made for very good theatre. In keeping with that une of thinking,
one might then argue that, for a Renaissance playwright, the slaying of a powerful and
eloquent female would have been considered a very effective ingredient for a successful
tragic plot. Such a speculation begs for an increased understanding and awareness of the
principles that govern the narrative emplotment of Early Modem drama, and of what
significance plot has in predetermining how Shakespeare’ s characters are rhetorically
constructed.
Building a theory of rhetoricaf identity for Shakespeare’s characters may be
considered in part as an effort to assess and acknowledge the extent to which
Shakespearean character development was influenced by classical poetics. In the
introduction to their collection of essays, Shakespeare and the CÏassics (2004), Charles
Martindale and A.B. Taylor explain that while Shakespeare is known to have had only a
grammar-school education, “[k]nowledge ofthe ancients which the humanists called the
studia humanitatis informs his work throughout” (2). Written in 4th century BC,
Aristotle’s Poetics is widely considered to be one of the most significant texts
rediscovered by the Renaissance humanist movement, and one of the most influential
documents ever produced on the subject of aesthetics. Whfle Shakespeare may not have
read the Poetics itself scholars agree that he would have digested and absorbed much of
the Greek and Roman tragedy and comedy
— and would therefore have been
predisposed to many of the classical formal techniques
— that Aristotie was referencing
and cataloging in his seminal treatise on the principles of drama. Supporting an
Aristotelian theorization and interpretation of Shakespearean character is Christy
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Desmet’s belief that “[t]he Poetics is a crucial text in the history of Shakespearean
character criticism; through its connection with the Rhetoric and Aristotle’s writings on
ethics, it is also relevant to classical and Renaissance representations of ethical
character” (4). In its pivotai examination of tragedy, the Poetics underscores the
inextricable and ethical relationship between character and plot (muthos) in the genre,
and in so doing explains both the paradoxical condition of, and the possibility in the
exceptional rhetorical Shakespearean female, who is designed and deployed as a
sensational tragic device.
Essentially, the Aristotelian dramatic principle that the moral quality of the
character forms the drama
— and vice versa — crucially predetermines the fate of that
character in Renaissance, or neoclassical, dramatic structures. A tragedy is a
manipulative enterprise, and by its very dramatic form and purpose is designed to seek
and hopefully secure the engagement and the emotional investment of its audience. A
tragedy therefore must present its viewers with a plotiine and with characters that are, in
a word, convincing. In Chapter 6 of Aristotle’s Poetics, a tragedy is defined as “the
imitation (mimesis) of an action that is serious, complete, and substantial. It uses
language enriched in different ways, cadi appropriate to its part of the action]. It is
drama [that is, it shows people performing actions] and not narration. By evoking pity
and terror it brings about the purgation (catharsis) of those emotions” (McLeish 9).
With the aim of provoking certain emotional responses (pathos) in its audience, and
without the benefit of any overarching narrative or omnipresent narrator, a tragedy
relies heaviiy upon the “enriched language” of its “people” to successfully convey its
own purposes, and to compel its viewers to invest themselves in the action. In this way,
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dramatis personae acquire their characteristics and speech patterns based on what
specific language the plot requires, at any given point, in order to be properly
transmitted and catalyzed.
It is important to note here that “enriched language” cannot be taken to mean
“rhetoric” per se, even though rhetoric is technically a heightened form of speech, and a
more ornate type of language. In fact, Aristotie immediately specifies that “[b]y
language which is ‘enriched’ I mean metrically organized speech and song, and by
‘each appropriate to its part’ I mean that some parts are spoken and others sung”
(McLeish 9). These specific instructions
— that language must be both “organized” and
“appropriate” in drama
— more than suggest that the type of language used by a
dramatist must accord with and enhance the action that is being put forth at any point,
so that the action is well-received and accepted by the audience. That stipulation lends
itselfto the basic drarnatic principle that words must be carefully selected and grouped,
and appropriately delivered in a play in order for the audience to be convinced or
pleased, and ultimatefy satisfied. If “rhetoric” is the effective use of language, and/or
persuasive speech itseW, and characters are the necessary vehicles of the language that is
meant to sway an audience, then dramatic characters are in fact rhetorical vessels, or
containers of rhetoric. Aristotie describes the manner in which drarnatic figures are
indeed characterized by their rhetoric, and by the individual choices that they attempt to
explain and defend with their speech:
Plays imitate actions first, character second and reason third. By ‘reason’
I mean the ability to express the range of options in each situation and to
choose the most appropriate. In tragedy, this cornes in the spoken
dialogue; in life it is what politicians and trained rhetoricians do... Just
as character reveals the moral status of people making deliberate choices
about courses of action where none are obvious (for if no choice is to be
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made, no character is required), so reason is revealed in a speech where
someone argues for one side or another, or utters an informed opinion of
anykind. (11)
In other words, characters are required to “seli” what they do, which means that plot
(muthos), character, and rhetoric are inextricably bound together — and, arguably,
equally important
— in drama. Furthermore, the generic interdependency of these
elements has implications for the moral assessment of dramatic character. As Desmet
asserts, the Aristotelian theoretical relationship between character and plot is such that
“{w]hen character is considered as a by-product of plot, drarna is closely related to
ethics: Dramatic agents have ethical character so that we may judge their actions as we
judge men at the end of their public lives” (5-6). This basic understanding of ethical
character is crucial in reminding us that characters generally end up being “good” or
“bad” because the greater drama requires them to fil those roles; once slotted into those
categories, characters’ dramatic fates are sealed, and so they are rewarded and punished
accordingly. However, significantly complicating the judgment of characters and their
actions
— which is to say, their placement along the ethical “continuum of virtue and
vice” (Desmet 4)
— are the necessary efforts of ail characters to justify what they do,
and to reinforce their own position, as well as the audience’s favor, tbrough rhetorical
means.
While a character may be deemed “good” or “bad” on the basis of its virtuous or
vicious actions, those binary classifications do flot necessarily hoid when the judgment
of character becomes an aesthetic evaluation. There is an inherent tension in the
conjunction of classical poetics and rhetoric
— of dramatic structure and the art of
persuasion — that may be quaiified as the crucial space that is formed, and which exists,
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between the practical purpose of rhetoric and the actual eJfect of rhetoric. More simply
put, it contains the possible success or failure of rhetoric to persuade — and to delight —
its intended audience. It is an aesthetic, interpretive space which is ultimately under the
audience’s jurisdiction and subject to its scrutiny, but which the playwright attempts to
manipulate and control through his art and craftsmanship. In drama, and in literary
studies, as in a courtroom, much depends upon argument and persuasion, and upon the
ability of rhetoric to achieve its desired resuit — particularly when that rhetoric has an
effect upon the way a given character is perceived and judged. That rhetorical
contingency is what forces the ethics and aesthetics of drama — which are structurally
necessitated and intertwined by plot
— to part ways, and it is what allows characters to
shed their dramatic roles and fates and to embody their individual rhetorical identities.
Remarkably, it is the fusion and flot the separation of ethics and aesthetics that is
the subject of Desmet’s study which has, more than any other text, inspired and
influenced my own theory of rhetorical identity; in Reading Shakespeare ‘s Characters,
Desmet cruciatly reestablishes the importance of rhetoric in the creation of ethical
character in Shakespeare. However for Desmet, Aristotles’s discussion of ethical
character is problematized when he introduces, in Chapter 13, the concept of the tragic
hero — an “intermediate kind of personage, a man not preeminently virtuous and just,
whose misfortune, however. is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some
fault, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity”
(Desmet 6; Bywater 2325). The notion of a morally-ambiguous and complicated figure
that evades ethical classification blatantly contradicts Aristotle’s prior definition of
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characters as being basic imitators of good or bad actions, and emphasizes Aristotle’s
awareness of the importance of verisimilitude in the composition of dramatic character.
With the response of the audience (catharsis) in mmd, Aristotie writes that “pity
is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves”
(Bywater 2325). By indicating that “some great fault on [the character’s] part” may be
used to arouse pity and fear in the audience, Aristotie paradoxically privileges character
over action and reinforces the ability of a more lifelike and “human” character to
transcend a plot and be considered apart from it. Desmet glosses over this “second,
more familiar account of character and catharsis [in the Poetics which] underlies the
readings of traditional character critics from Sarnuel Johuson to A.C. Bradley” (7). She
writes:
The hero’s imperfections, in the second case, are necessary to the
mechanism of catharsis: Neither a hyperbolicalÏy virtuous hero nor an
unjustly successful villain would encourage catharsis. Aristotle’s new
tragic hero, both good and imperfect
— like us — begins to free himsetf
from the restrictions ofhis plot and to cail for psychological
identification rather than ethical judgment. (7)
Character criticism of the Johnson and Bradley (and more recently, Harold Bloom)
variety, known largely for treating Shakespeare’s robust characters as if they were real
people, has been dismissed by many Shakespeareans as being ostentatious and
speculative. Desmet, by contrast, seeks to firmly ground the Shakespearean character in
its own ethical identity and development, and in its own literary and socio-historical
context:
The rhetoric of characterization, by submitting the chaos of an
individual’ s life to extreme categories of virtue and vice, necessarily
fictionalizes character. The speaker shapes lis subject’s life to pass a
final judgment on him: He both describes and creates a character,
chronicles a life and fabricates a fiction. But because rhetorical forms are
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public and traditional, the verbal structures of epideictic oratory reflect
the truth ofsociaijudgment. (81)
If, at one end of the spectrum of character criticism, we have Shakespeare’s characters
being wholly extracted from their dramatic context, and at the other end we have them
being permanently embedded in linguistic and social structures, a theory of rhetorical
identity serves to respectfully recognize those opposing reading practices, and to
reconcile them, without compromising the integrity or purpose of either one. Rhetorical
identity is an aesthetic methodology with ethical origins. To assess a character’s
rhetoricai identity is thus to understand the structures and forces that fashioned it, and
then to let it exist and function apart from its own foundation. Much in the way the
parent nurtures and raises a child in his ber own image, and that child eventually
becomes an independent aduit, the playwright designs characters that will aiways reflect
bis intentions, but which eventually become entities that are separate from their
dramatic source.
I have described and argued for rhetorical character identity as a process
— both
of rhetorical constitution and interaction, and of character evolution beyond structure. If
we recognize that these aspects of character identity are ail activities, then the poetics of
drama, from which characters originate, are also inherently active, and therefore cease
to be restrictive. In his “Emplotment: A Reading of Aristotle’s Poetics,” Paui Ricoeur
provides a very usefui set of ideas and terms for understanding the unfixed nature of
Aristotelian poetics. According to bis reading, “the adjective ‘poetic’ (with its implied
noun, ‘art’)... alone puts the mark of production, construction, and dynamism on ail the
analyses, and first of ail on the two terms muthos and mimesis, which have to be taken
as operations, not as structures” (33). While Ricoeur asserts that the Poetics is “a
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treatise on composition, with almost no concem for anyone who receives the resuit”
(48), he also argues that emplotment and mimesis
— the cornerstones of Aristotelian
dramatic discourse
— are purposeful and effective doings that essentially incorporate
their own reception:
The Poetics does not speak of structure but of structuration. Structuration
is an oriented activity that is only completed in the spectator or the
reader... Catharsis is... a purgation — which has its proper seat in the
spectator. It consists precisely in the fact that the pleasure proper to
tragedy proceeds from pity and fear... Yet this subjective alchemy is
also constructed in the work by the mimetic activity. It resuits from the
fact that the pitiable and fearful incidents are, as we have said,
themseÏves brought to representation. And this poetic representation of
these emotions resuits in tum from the composition itself And in this
sense, the dialectic of outside and inside reaches its highest point in
catharsis. Experienced by the spectator, it is constructed in the work. (4$-
50)
The circularity of Ricoeur’s concept of dramatic “structuration” — which argues that the
tragedy and the spectator’s emotional response to it are in fact mutually creative — is
crucial in formally reestablishing the drama as a medium of communication between a
text and an audience, and even more specifically, as a dynamic linguistic system, with
built-in transmitters, which are the characters; receptors, which are the spectators; and a
message, which is the tragedy itself.
The active relationships between the composition and communication of drama.
and between the rhetorical constitution and interaction of dramatic character, can also
be understood as more practical configurations and applications of the language/speech
correlation that subtends the modem semiological studies of french literary and social
theorist Roland Barthes. In 1916, Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in GeneraÏ
Linguistics based a general science of signs, or semiology (also called semiotics), in
part on a hard distinction between language (langue), as the conventionalized,
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underlying system of signs in a society, and speech (parole), as the individualized
articulation and extemalization of that system. Saussure also expanded that science to
include ail basic systems of signification, of which structural linguistics would form
only one part, and in so doing laid the groundwork for the school of structuralism that
would influence academic thought and work on the subjects of language, culture, and
society throughout the 20111 century. As a precursor to the post-structuralist movement,
Barthes sought to reassess the “dichotomie concept of language/speech” as being
instead a dialectical one, and to renegotiate the predorninance of language in ail systems
of communication (Elements 13).
for Barthes, linguistics is not a brandi of semiology, as in Saussure’s
estimation; rather, semiology is branch of linguistics, and the study of how language
articulates the world and the self. Barthes’ Elements ofsemiology (1964) constitutes a
bold inversion of Saussure’s revolutionary distinctions, as well as a redefinition of
semiology to include more modem views and forms of media:
Now it is far from certain that in the social life oftoday there are to be
found any extensive systems of signs outside human language... It is
truc that objects, images, and pattems ofbehaviour can signify, and do
so on a large scale, but neyer autonomously; every semiological system
has its linguistic admixture.... Semiology is therefore perhaps destined to
be absorbed into a trans-linguistics, the materials of which may be myth,
narrative. journalism, or on the other hand objects ofour civilization, in
so far as they are spoken (through press, prospectus, interview,
conversation and perliaps even the inner language, which is ruled by the
law of the imagination). (Elernents 9-11)
for Barthes, every type of sign — including the image
— contains a measure of language,
and semiology becomes a broader science of signification, which lie qualifies as an
active, verbal process. While Barthes, like Saussure, distinguishes language as a “social
institution and a system of values” (Elements 14), he does flot compartmentalize or set
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the speech act apart from its originating and informing body of language, for in his
view. “language is at the same time the product and the instrument of speech: their
relationship is therefore a genuinely dialectical one” (Etements 16). Beyond how it
literally “realizes” language, Barthes favors speech as being the reifying force in the
outward establishment of subjective identity:
In contrast to the language, which is both institution and system, speech
is essentially an individual act of selection and actualization; it is made
in the first place ofthe ‘combination thanks to which the speaking
subject can use the code ofthe language with a view to expressing his
personal thought’ (this extended speech could be called discourse), and
secondly by the ‘psycho-physical mechanisms which allow him to
exteriorize these combinations.’ (Elements 14-15)
In his affirmation of the speaking subject’s ability and tendency to choose the words
that best express his own thoughts, Barthes emphasizes the “capital importance” of the
“combinative aspect of speech” in individuating a person (Elernents 15). Relating to this
thesis, the concept of speech as a “combinative activity” (Elements 15) is both rhetorical
and identifying in its effects, as any process of verbal decision-making necessarily
involves a conscious effort to choose sequences of words that will most effectively
represent and communicate the self.
With its overail emphasis on dynamic structures, Barthesian theory is
particularly accommodating of a concept of rhetorical identity. By re-evatuating the
Saussurian distinction between language and speech as the relationship between an
underlying linguistic system and practical social and cultural event, Barthes facilitates
the application of his terms to the dramatic character, which can then be seen as being
rooted in text, but constructed, and therefore solely characterized by his or her own
speech. Also supporting the notion of verbally-constituted and dramatically
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independent character is Barthes’ most famous essay, “The Death of the Author,” in
which lie argues that “[l]inguistically, the author is neyer more than the instance
writing, just as lis nothing other than the instance saying L language knows a ‘subject,’
not a ‘person,’ and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it,
suffices to make language ‘hold together,’ suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it” (145).
Separate from the authorial intention which both adheres to and dictates tlie structure of
the play, it is tlie speaking character
— the otherwise-empty, enunciating subject
— that
maintains the integrity of the text (or drama), and of its own individual identity.
further ensuring that these dialectics are directly transferable and relatable to a
theory of rhetorical identity for the dramatic character is Barthes’ exposition on the
“Rhetoric of the Image,” in which he attempts to ascertain how the image, with its
linguistic and iconic components, produces signification. Asserting that “ail images are
polysemous,” or containing multiple meanings (“Rhetoric” 38-9), Barthes argues for
how such composite messages can be variously received and interpreted, and yet remain
linguisticaliy and compositionaliy “anchored” (“Rhetoric” 3$). He writes:
The image, in its connotation, is thus constituted by an architecture of
signs drawn from a variable depth of lexicons (of idiolects); each
lexicon, no matter how ‘deep,’ stili being coded, if, as is thouglit today,
thepsyche itselfis articulated like a language... The variability of
readings, therefore, is no threat to the ‘language’ ofthe image if it be
admitted that the language is composed of idiolects, lexicons, and sub
codes. The image is penetrated through and through by the system of
meaning, in exactly the same way as man is articulated to the very depths
ofhis being in distinct languages. The image is not merely the totaÏity of
utterances emitted... it is aiso the totality of utterances received...(“Rhetoric” 47)
Barthes’ theoretical acceptance of a “variability of readings” for a single, albeit
complex language recaïls the aforementioned contingency of rhetoric
— the aesthetic
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space between the purpose and the effect ofrhetoric
— and the fact that however rhetoric
is received. it is stiil carefully selected and employed, and therefore stiil combines and
coheres in a single fashion in the imagination. This last passage from Barthes is also
useful in that it conceptually unites “image” and “man” in a seif-defining process of
utterance and articulation. He in fact goes on in his essay to group ail efforts at
signification and identification into one formai, rhetorical category:
Rhetorics inevitabiy vary their substance (here articuiated sound, there
image, gesture or whatever) but flot necessarily by their form; it is even
probable that there exists a single rhetoricaÏform, common for instance
to dream, literature and image. Thus the rhetoric ofthe image... is
specific to the extent that it is subj cet to the physical constraints of
vision.., but general to the extent that the ‘figures’ are neyer more than
formai relations of elements. (“Rhetoric” 49)
Dramatic characters
— as rhetorical objects, as speaking subjects
— are essentialiy formai
figures, begging to be individually examined and identified as the intricate, verbal
images that they are. While those images may flot “speak” to every viewer in exactly
the same way, that does not change the fact that they were built to look, sound, and act
in certain ways. In other words, while a character
— or rather, the image a character
projects
— is formally independent from the person who constructed it, it simply cannot
be free from its own dramatic or textual design, its own verbal substance, or its own
invariable subjection to character assessment and judgment.
Despite any and ail attempts to theoreticaily liberate the character from its
literary text or social context, dramatic characters are inevitably and generically
required, for the sake of plot and action, to be judged in one way or another. Barthes
reiterates the manner in which “the image” is structuraliy, and therefore sociaiiy and
moraiiy, encumbered:
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The text is indeed the creator’s (and hence society’s) right of inspection
over the image; anchorage is a control, bearing a responsibility
— in the
face ofthe projective power ofpictures
— for the use ofthe message.
With respect to the liberty ofthe signifieds ofthe image, the text has thus
a repressive value and we can see that it is at this level that the rnorality
and ideology ofa society are all invested. (“Rhetoric” 40)
Certainly, the moral and ideological forces ofa society influence the production and the
reception of a text, thereby restricting the “projective power” of its corresponding
images. The images of Shakespeare’s rhetorical female characters are perhaps the best
examples of this in that moral and social judgments of their rhetoric serve to curb their
character lives, and to limit their “projective power”
— or rather their capacity to be
transgressive or progressive
— within their character societies, and in Early Modem
society. Subject to the ethical judgments of their societies, rhetorical women are
considered to be vice figures, are deemed bad, and are punished. What is at stake then,
in the endeavor to create and apply a theory of rhetorical identity to Shakespearean
female characterization, is a critical shifi from the ethical judgment of character
behavior, to the aesthetic evaluation of character rhetoric. $uch a shifi involves
connotational realignments for the terms “good” and “bad”
— away from being moral
intimations of “virtue” and “vice,” or “riglit” and “wrong,” and towards being aesthetic
categorizations ofwhat, in art, seems to be “pleasurable,” “favorable,” or “compelling,”
and what is considered to be more “distasteful,” “offensive,” or “inaccessible” to a
beholder. Far from being falsely dependent on the subjective value-judgments of
individual spectators, the assessment of the rhetorical identity of a character involves
searching for the evidence of craftsmanship in that character’s speech, and for any
possible discrepancies between the purpose and the effect of his or her rhetoric;
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essentially, it serves to distinguish a character’s dramaticfate from his or her rhetorical
Ïegacy.
0f course, an argument in favor of a shift in character criticism from the ethical
to the aesthetic is distinctly modem in its ideology. b daim that Early Modem
characters ought to be considered apart from their ethical origins and stigmatizations,
and judged according to the quality of their own speech, seems rather essentialist and
ahistoric; and yet, there is something universally viable
— something inherently truthfiul
— about a theory that rhetoric is, and always has been, self-identifying. Ong wTites that
“[o]rality is a pervasive affair... from antiquity through the Renaissance and to the
beginnings of romanticism, under ail teaching about the art of verbal expression there
lies the more or less dominant supposition that the paradigm of all expression is the
oration” (3). Recalling that “[a]ll human culture was... initialiy rhetorical in the sense
that before the introduction of writing ail culture was oral,” Ong asserts that “human
thought structures are tied in with verbalization,” and that “[r]hetoric clearly occupies
an intermediary stage between the unconscious and the conscious” (2, 11-12). further
supporting the notion that public speaking develops and characterizes the self is Charles
Taylor’s seminal work of moral philosophy, Sources ofthe Seîf The Making ofModern
Identity, in which he posits that identity is defined through speech relations:
[O]ne caimot be a self on one’s own. I am a self only in relation to
certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation
partners who were essential to my achieving seif-definition; in another in
relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of
languages of self-understanding
— and, of course, these classes may
overlap. A self exists only within what I cali ‘webs of interlocution.’ .. .It
is this original situation which gives its sense to our concept of “identity,’
offering an answer to the question of who I am through a definition of
where I am speaking from and to whom. The full definition of
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someone’s identity thus usually involves flot only his stand on moral and
spiritual matters but also some reference to a defining community. (36)
In Part I of Sources ofthe Sef— “Identity and the Good” — Taylor endeavors to relocate
the establishment of identity from the reaim of communal ethical conduct to that of
individual utterance, and to realign the modem moral code away from theistic
definitions and toward more individualized conceptions and articulations of what is
“good.” In so doing, Taylor validates a more open-minded, subjective, aesthetic
interpretation and evaluation of hurnan ciaracter
— one that values personal expression
—
and in so doing inadvertently enables a theory of dramatic characterization based on
rhetoric (aesthetics), rather than action (ethics).
Remarkably, much in the way the theory of rhetorical identity is both rooted in
and reaching beyond structure, Taylor’s efforts to establish a theory of modem identity
are predicated upon the realization that “the path to articulacy has to be a historical
one,” and that “[w]e have to try to trace the development of our modem outlooks”
(104). According to Taylor, “[sJelffiood and the good. .[or] selfliood and morality” are
“inextricably intertwined themes,” but “t]lie understanding of the good as a moral
source lias... been deeply suppressed in tlie mainstream of modem moral
consciousness, although it was perfectly familiar to the ancients” (3, 92). However, in
conceding that “[tJhe original form ofthis affirmation was theological, and it involved a
positive vision of ordinary life as hallowed by God,” Taylor must contend that ‘modem
naturalism not only can’t accept this theistic context; it lias divested itself of all
languages of higher worth” (104). Indeed, in keeping with his chronicling and
presentation of a modem code of ethics that shapes identity, Taylor expressly uses the
term “good” in a “highly general sense, designating anything considered valuable,
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worthy, admirable, of whatever kind or category” (92). In large part, Sources ofthe Self
constitutes an effort to reconcile identity with morality by diversifying and expanding
their respective definitions, and hence their relationship; Taylor writes that “[i]n fact,
our visions of the good are tied up with our understandings of the self... We have a
sense of who we are through our sense of where we stand to the good. But... radicaliy
different senses of what the good is go along with quite different conceptions of what a
human agent is, different notions of the self’ (105). Ultimately, for Taylor, “{a]rticulacy
is a crucial condition ofreconciliation,” but it is the articulation ofthe good which poses
the greatest challenge to the moral conflicts and identity crises of modem culture.
The theory of rhetoricai identity redefines what an audience thinks of as being
“good” about a dramatic character. If we consider that selves exist within, and are
fashioned by their respective “webs of interlocution,” then dramatic characters have two
“defining communities” (to borrow the ternis from Taylor’s taxonomy) within which
they must articulate their own moraiity: their own character societies, and their
metadramatic societies, which include their spectators, readers, and critics. Both of
these communities are in fact rhetoricai, judgmental spaces, where identity and viability
hinge upon the persuasiveness of speech. Taylor explains that “articulation(s) of the
good” will have varying degrees of success, depending upon the receptivity of a
community to a given articulation, and upon the quality ofits delivery:
Some formulations may be dead, or have no power at this place or time
or with certain people. And in the most evident examples the power is
flot a function ofthe formulation alone, but ofthe whole speech act.
Indeed, the most powerful case is where the speaker, the formulation,
and the act of delivering the message ali une up to reveal the good... A
formulation has power when it when it brings the source close, when it
makes it plain and evident, in ail its inherent force, its capacity to inspire
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our love, respect, or allegiance. An effective articulation releases this
force, and this is how words have power. (96)
As the coming chapters will demonstrate, the articulations of rhetorical Shakespearean
female characters meet with numerous challenges, and have varying degrees of success
within their respective character societies. In the tragicomedies (Ail Well That Ends
Well, Measure for Measure), they are more appreciated and allowed, even if they are
flot explicitly acknowÏedged as such by their male counterparts; in the tragedies
(OtheÏlo, Macbeth), those articulations are feared and/or disregarded, and always
reprimanded, and eventually silenced. Ultimately, the question ofthe female character’s
fate in a Shakespearean play relies upon the extent to which her rhetoric is valued
within her dramatic world; most frequently, in that realm, it fails upon deaf cars. The
same caimot be said, however, for the world inhabited and experienced by the
Shakespearean audience; within that community, Helena, Isabella, Lady Macbeth, and
Desdemona are flot only very well heard, but have a tremendous capacity to inspire
love, respect, and allegiance, and in fact they do. They do so because their rhetorical
identities overpower and outlast their dramatic ones, to the point where we can say,
without question, that while Shakespeare’s females may flot be virtuous characters, they
are nothing if not exceptionally good ones.
Chapter 2
Helena: Paradigm and Possibility
3$
Ail ‘s Well That Ends Well (1602-3) constitutes nothing less than an extensive
Shakespearean commentary on the possibility that is created flot just when a woman
speaks, but when she actualizes and develops a relationship with speech itse1f, thereby
learning how to use it effectively and, most importantly, to her own advantage. In
providing the character of Helena with a certain other figure, one perfectly-named
Parolles (an obvious, nomenclatural synthesis of the french la parole, meaning
‘speech,’ and paroles, meaning ‘words’), Shakespeare masterfully infuses his heroine
with the rhetoric required to get everything she wants, the way she wants, and then
actuaily get away with it in the fictional world of Ail ‘s Well. Pivotai to this entire thesis
is its assertion and upfront examination of Helena as an entirely exceptional and
“divineiy gified” Lady Rhetoric, who expertiy and openiy navigates the linguistic world
of Ail ‘s WelÏ That Ends WeÏl, avoiding ail censure and punishment, in the ultimate
fulfiulment of her deepest desires. As the consummate transgressor of both dramatic and
societal rules, Helena and her relationship with language provide the narrative model
for this project’s understanding and theorizing ofrhetorical identity.
We would do weÏl to recali, at this point, one thing we can know for sure about
Shakespeare: he did not write in a vacuum. If we are going to discuss exceptional,
speaking Renaissance femaies, then we cannot disregard the fact that the rnost
outstanding and inspirational Lady Rhetoric of Shakespeare’s time was prominently
positioned upon the throne of England. Carole Levin and Patricia Sullivan write: “In the
Renaissance
— as in any period — most women belonged to family units and had roles as
wives, mothers, daughters, and widows.... There were aiso, of course, some exceptional
women who found more public arenas for their gifis and ambitions.... The Renaissance
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was a time of women in public roTes
— of queens...” (5-6). Well educated, well
respected, and holding the highest public office of a powerful, leading nation, Queen
Elizabeth I provided the supreme example of a woman’s capacity during the
Renaissance.
Philippa Berry explains that at the time of Elizabeth’s assent to the throne in
155$, even the Puritan John Calvin
— albeit eager to support her Protestant reign —
publicly modified attacks made against prior Catholic monarchs on the basis of their
femininity by claiming that “there were occasionally women so endowed, that the
singular good qualifies which shone forth in them made it evident that they were raised
up by Divine authority” (69). 0f course. because the society under her remained acutely
patriarchal, Elizabeth was (and is) considered to be the exception to its gender rules
—
rules that she was far more concemed with manipulating than changing (Berry 61). As a
matter of fact, Elizabeth I translated seamÏessly into the art of her time because she
neyer failed to appear as a perfectly-played part and a carefully-constructed image. If
she was anomalous and marvelous, it was because she made herseif so. Carole Levin
writes, “Elizabeth I was very skilled at how she represented herseif and her authority as
monarch. She was able to capitalize on the expectations of her behavior as a woman and
use them to her advantage; she also at times placed herseif beyond traditional gender
expectations by calling herseif king” (1). Though her own personal motto was “Semper
Eadem”
— “Always the same”
— Elizabeth’s success as a monarch was the resuit ofhow
“fluid and multi-faceted her representations ofherselfwere” (Levin 2).
To fend off attacks against her femininity, Elizabeth shrewdly presented herseif
as having two bodies: a body natural that was gendered female, and a masculine body
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poïltic” (Levin 122). In order to command respect and adoration for the former, she
shuimed ail suitors and declared herseif to be “married to her people,” thereby
encouraging idealized worship of herseif as a perpetual “virgin queen” (Dreher 17). To
promote and support the latter body, she conducted her career as a “Renaissance
prince,” frequently referring to herseif as “prince” in public (Dreher 17), and once
famously declaring herseif in possession of “the heart and stomach of a king” (Neale
308-9). Throughout her career, which spanned Shakespeare’s younger life, Elizabeth
maintained control over her own iconography by paying strict attention to her rhetoric
and her conduct at ah times. Levin relates that “even in her most casual, seemingly
spontaneous remarks, Ehizabeth was playing a role, aware of how her audience would
respond” (131). According to Beryl Hughes, “no other Enghish monarch had such an
obsession with lier own stage management” (39).
In “Shakespeare’s Comic Heroines, Elizabeth I, and the Pohitical Uses of
Androgyny,” Leah Marcus suggests that “there are remarkable correlations between the
sexual multivalence of Shakespeare’s heroines and... the political rhetoric of Queen
Elizabeth I” (137). Also referring to the comedies, Levin asserts that “it is the non
cross-dressed heroines who expand gender definitions — who as women act in powerful
ways that might, like the actions of the queen, be called ‘male” (127). During the
crucial first scene of Ail ‘s Weii That Ends Weii, the “Ehizabethan” qualities of Helena’s
character are made quite apparent, beginning with her shrewd intellect. At the outset of
the play the King of france is deathly iii, and the Countess of Rossilhion has become
guardian to an orphaned Helena, whose recently deceased father was a much respected
and renowned physician to the monarch. The Countess fondly describes Helena’s good
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nature and solid potential — which apparently contradict her own son Bertram’s qualities
— to the old lord Lafew: “I have those hopes of her good that her education promises.
Her disposition she inherits, which makes fair gifts fairer... She derives her honesty and
achieves her goodness” (1. 1.30-1, 34-5).
As a matter of fact, Helena’s intelligence usurps ber own “honesty” in the very
first instant that she speaks. Helena has been crying, and the Countess, assuming that
she is mouming her father, encourages her to collect herseif “lest it be rather thought
you affect a sorrow than to have” (1.1.41). Helena replies, “I do affect a sorrow indeed,
but I have it too” (1.1.42). Though this phrase seems to be a daim on the part of Helena
that that the affectation of an emotion does flot necessarily preclude its being feit, we
become aware during the first unes of her first soliloquy that her crying has indeed
involved a certain pretension: “I think flot on my father, / And these great tears grace his
remembrance more / Than those I shed for him.... / My imagination / Carnes no favour
in’t but Bertram’s. II am undone!” (1.1.67-9, 70-2). Right from the start, Helena’s
words betray her character’ s innate understanding of doubling in language and in life, as
well as the capacity of speech to manipulate a social situation. However, she does not
yet recognize the possibilities in those concepts and skills, or ber potential to
appropriate them. Indeed, Helena is introduced as a wornan utterly bereft and hopeless
in her unrequited love for the apparently undeserving Bertram. Her speech indulges an
“idolatrous fancy”: “Twere all one / That I should love a bright particular star / And
think to wed it, he is so above me... / Ih’ambition in my love thus plagues itseW’
(1.1.73-5, 78). Helena’s language here is distinctly and ironically reminiscent of the
tropes voiced by Sir Philip Sidney’s “star-worshipping” Astrophil, and as such
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immediately suggests Helena’s ability and wiïlingness to adopt male rhetoric.’ Her
speech then takes an unexpected (though non-coincidental) sexual tum with a jarring
phrase
— one whose striking juxtaposition reveals an even deeper desire in Helena: “The
hind that would be mated by the lion / Must die for love” (1.1.79-$0). further lessening
the possibility of linguistic coincidence in this scene, this revelation of Helena’s libido
and biological imperative to procreate
— which may or may flot be drastically
influencing her affections (but that is another thesis)
— is swiftly followed up by the first
entrance ofthe lewd and flagrant Parolles.
The importance of Parolles in the overali structure and purpose of Ail ‘s WelÏ
simply caimot be overstated. Ris name, as one might imagine, is indicative of his
disposition and comic rote within his character society, but only slightly suggestive of
his pivotai function in the metadrama of the play. Even the divisive Harotd Bloom
covers his bases in explaining the character of Parolles; to Bloom, Parolles is both a
“splendid scoundrel” and “the spiritual center ofAll ‘s Well That Ends Wett” (346, 349).
In a nutshell, Parolles is an obnoxious, ridiculous, and garrulous man about court who,
over the course of the play, accosts Helena; thoroughly offends and disgusts almost
every other character (even the f001); negatively influences Bertram to abandon his wife
and responsibilities and mn away to war and into another woman’s bed; and in the end
is tricked by Bertram and two French lords into revealing bis unequivocal willingness to
betray his comrades and his country in order to save his own skin. Literally, Parolles is
a generally offensive pseudo-courtier and mock-soldier who presents a certain threat to
Sidney’s Astrophil andStella is considered one ofthe greatest ofthe Elizabethan courtly sonnets. It
exemplifies Petrarchan style and conventions. The narne Astrophil translates from the Greek words astro,
meaning “star,” and phit, meaning “lover,” while Stella cornes from the Latin word for “star” (Norton,
482-9$).
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the moral order of the french world depicted in Ail Weii. However, he is also, most
ironically, a literai metaphor — that is, he is a walking and taiking figure of speech. In
fact, bypassing any semantic disjunction between “speech” and “words” in the French
English translation or in the context ofthe play, Parolles is also metonymic in nature, for
lie is figurative language.
These altemate capacities implied in Parolles’ name, and their greater
significance for Ail ‘s WelÏ require some explanation. Russ McDonald describes the
representational and self-referential qualities of Shakespeare’s writing:
Shakespeare’s language functions as a symbolic register, an instrument
for recording, transmitting, and magnifying the conditions ofthe
fictional world that the play represents
— the conflicts, affinities, and
changes occurring among the persons who inhabit it. In fact, dramatic
speech or poetic language conforms admirably to the figure that critics
call a symbol because it both represents or symbolizes something else,
and yet commands attention as an entity itself. (6)
McDonald draws upon the work Sigurd Burckhardt who, in Shakespearean Meanings,
explains metaphors and puns as invaluable poetic tools which serve to “corporealize
language, because any device which interposes itself between words and their
supposedly simple meanings cails attention to the words as things” (2$). In terms of its
fictional world, Ail ‘s WeÏi is indeed linguistically characterized, in the sense that it is
riddled with the rhetoric of speech. In a straight reading of the play, one cannot miss the
abundant uses of the terms “speak,” “words,” “say” (often in close conjunction with
“hear”), “teli,” “communicate,” and “disclose.” I posit, therefore, that because the
character of Parolles is “corporealized language” indeed, or more specifically,
“corporealized speech,” that any critical imperative to look for the symbolism in his
language, and the language of those who interact with him, becomes intensified to the
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point where we are literally examining characters’ relationships with their own rhetoric.
Marion Trousdale describes the self-reflexivity of Shakespearean figures of speech:
When looked at in terms of verbal art, [Shakespearean metaphors]
suggest within the plays themselves a language that is ofien much more
explicit about its own function than we expect fictional language to be;
expressive as the speeches ofien may be, the analytic structures as such
establish another frame ofreference in addition to the dramatic, the
discursive, rational one of their art. (20)
As the embodiment of verbal communication, Parolles proves to be far more integral to
Alt ‘s Well than the meddling and amusing subplot feature that lie seems to be. In fact,
Parolles’ name declares lis purpose: to embody the speech of any character with whom
he interacts.
According to this rhetorical awareness, it is no coincidence that the criticaÏ scene
that Helena and Parolles share at the outset of the play tAct 1, Scene 1) is technically
the scene in which Helena speaks the majority of her character’s unes (Rothman 189).
While ilelena immediately recognizes Parolles for the rogue that he is, she is also aware
that he is Bertram’s friend, and is strangely drawn to him as if she thinks he might have
some important knowledge:
Who cornes here?
One that goes with [Bertram]. I love him for lis sake;
And yet I know him a notorious liar,
Think him a great way fool, solely a coward.
Yet these evils sit so fit in him
That they take place when virtue’s steely bones
Looks bleak i’th’cold wind. Withal, full oft we see
Cold wisdom waiting on superfluous folly. (1.1.86-93)
“Superfluous folly” (Parolles) immediately imparts his “cold wisdom” (metaphorical
insight) onto “virtue’s steely bones” (Helena), as Parolles gives Helena a royal greeting:
“Save you, fair queen!” “And you, monarch!” she quips. “No,” Parolles replies. Helena
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also denies the titie: “And no” (1.1.94-97). Jeremy Richard argues that this “opening
exchange emphasizes the gap between language and reality.” and that “[thc] admission
that the world of courtly compliment is out of place for these two speakers sets the tone
for the dialogue, one in which insuit scarcely remains beneath the surface” (148). This
is true to a certain extent, but I would argue that the honesty in this exchange and the
explicit nature of the ensuing discussion serve to stimulate Helena’s awareness of the
power of rhetoric to bridge the gap between language and reality. Crucially, she is
beginning to realize that saying something can actually make it 5° — that rhetoric is a
tool that she miglit, like a queen, very well use. So whlle Parolles may provide the
outrageously offensive next une
— “Are you meditating on virginity?” (1.1.98) — Helena
does flot rebuke him as one might suppose a maiden would. Instead, she pursues the
conversation with absolute vigor, and a newfound cunning: “Ay. You have some stain
of soldier in you: let me ask you a question. Man is enemy to virginity; how may we
barricado it against him?” (1.1.99-101).
0f course, Helena’s assertion that she wishes to protect lier virtue rather
contradicts her privately expressed desire to “be mated,” but it displays Helena’s desire
to push the boundaries of ber own speech without seeming to — to say one thing and
mean another, on purpose. Jules Rothman describes this development: “. . . Shakespeare
has Helena change character. from a sweet girl in love she switches over to a court lady
ready to bandy bawdy” (191). After some witty and salacious repartee on the subject of
defending and losing virginity
— including references to men “blowing up”
(impregnating) virgins and virgins, in turn, wishing to “blow up men” (militarily
speaking, but Helena’s double entendre is obvious) (1.1.106-10) — Helena boldly asks
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Parolles a straight question: “How might one do, sir, to lose it to her own liking”
(1.1.129). Under any other circumstances, such a question would be appalling, only this
conversation with Parolles has clearly enabled Helena to speak lier mmd and to openly
consider flot only what she wants (to lose lier virginity), but the way she wants it (with
Bertram). Parolles’ best advice to Helena is to do away with her virginity as soon as
possible, because “the longer kept, the less worth,” for “old virginity, is like one of our
French weathered pears: it looks iii, it eats drily” (1.1.13 1-2, 136-7).
As Helena begins to see the potential of her own character in a kaleidoscopic
new light, her language adjusts to suit the revelation. Employing the oxymoronic
conceit of Petrarchan courtly love poetry, Helena reveals her objective
— flot unlike
Queen Elizabeth’s — to embody diverse roles in a quest for admiration and favor. $he
informs Parolles:
Not rny virginity yet:
There shah your master have a thousand loves,
A mother, and a mistress, and a friend,
A phoenix, captain, and an enemy.
A guide, a goddess, and a sovereign,
A counsellor, atraitress, and a dear... (1.1.140-5)
With increasing determination, Helena expresses lier will to rise above her station in life
among “the poorer bom, / whose baser stars do shut us up in wishes,” (1.1.58) and,
significantly, the conversation moves from the zodiac into the mythological as Parolles
is called away:
PAROLLES. Liille Helen, fareweli. If I can remember thee, I will think
ofthee at court.
HELEN. Monsieur Parohles, you were bom under a charitable star.
PAROLLES. Under Mars I.
HELENA. I especiafly think, under Mars. (1.1.163-7)
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Mars is at once the planet and the Roman god of war, and Parolles associates himself
with the symbol in an shameless effort to boister his own image as a warrior and hunter.
Also, Susan Snyder draws attention to Parolles’ addressing of Helena as “Helen”:
“[from this point on] Shakespeare continues to use ‘Helen’ in the rest of the play’s
dialogue, in prose as well as in verse... The preference... suggests that an association
with Helen of Troy, the most famous bearer of that name, was becoming important to
him” (271). Snyder recails the mythic Helen — beautiful and desired, the reason for the
Trojan War — and explains that while Shakespeare’s Helen “ironically inverts [thatJ
prototype... she can daim in lier own way a status as Venus’ protégée, flot indeed as
desired object but as desiring subject” (272).
Parolles and Helen are thus Mars and Venus colliding, only with a twist:
Parolles is naturally lying about his own symbolic disposition. Helena goes on to mock
Parolles’ cowardice in battie as proof of his having been born under Mars “when he was
retrograde”: “You go so much backward when you fight... But the composition that
your valour and fear makes in you is a virtue of good wing, and I like the wear well”
(1.1.172, 174, 176-8). Parolles is indeed lefi with no clever response: “I am so full of
businesses that I cai-mot answer thee acutely. I will return perfect courtier, in the which
my instruction shah serve to naturalise thee, so thou wilt be capable of a courtier’s
council” (1.1.179-81). Parolles is suggesting that lie will retum to ‘school’ Helena in the
ways of sexual conquest, only she needs no further lessons from him. Not only is she
now ftilly aware of what she wants and how to get it, she has also clearly outwitted her
own master in this encounter, suggesting that Venus and Mars — body natural and body
politic — are now united in her.
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With spoken language conferred upon her, Helena is now the hunter. By the
time Paroiles takes bis leave of her and gives bis last pearis of wisdom
— “Get thee a
good husband, and use him as he uses thee. So fareweil.” (1.1.185-6) — Helena does flot
even need to be told. Her soliloquy
— spoken in fourteen lines of seven rhyming
couplets ta complete soimet), and suggesting a miraculous injection of language and
power — reveals the complete transformation of her character from a desperate, ignorant
maiden into a confident, determined woman:
Our remedies ofi in ourselves do lie,
Which we ascribe to heaven. The fated sky
Gives us free scope; only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are duli.
What power is it which mounts my love so high?
That makes me see, and cannot feed mine eye?
The mightiest space in fortune nature brings
Tojoin the likes, and kiss like native things.... (1.1.187-194)
Regardless of the challenge of social status, Helena’s “intents are fixed and will flot
leave [herJ” (1.1.200). Armed with her own rhetoric and self-awareness, she will go
about getting her man. Once their exchange is done, Helena and Parolles part ways, and
except for a few brief encounters which serve dramatically to relay information between
characters and generally guide the plot, they move separately throughout the rest of the
play. However, while their relationship is conceived in this interplay, it is not singularly
defined by it. Indeed, the effects of this “speech infusion” are potent and far-reaching,
and not entirely separate from the realm of language itself — that which, we recali,
Parolles also represents.
Over the course of the play, Helena uses practically every character at her
disposai, to some degree or another, in her quest to pin Bertram dowu At every tum,
her thinly-veiled rhetoric is both earnest and modest, and is thus entirely persuasive. At
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no point does she disguise herseif as a man to facilitate her social progress. She
convinces the Countess of her integrity and humility in her love of Bertram by
proclaiming her endeavor to “deserve him” (1.3.171), and in so doing gains complete
financial and emotional support of his own mother in ail lier endeavors. She then wins
over the trust of the ailing King of France as “Doctor She!” (2.1.75) by promising that,
with her late father’s medicinal gifts, “Health shah live free and sickness frcely die”
(2.1.166). Recalling her revelation of the “remedies [thatJ oft in ourselves do lie,” she
refers to her proposed “remedy” for the king as her “art” (2.1.135, 156)
— a clever
choice of words which, amidst lier flowery entreaty, alludes to the cure as being verbal
in constitution. Using select language, she convinces the king to accept lier care and
subsequently obtains the right to choose Bertram as lier husband in spite of lis own
fierce will and disdain. When Bertram funs away to war afler their marnage and
attempts to seduce the maiden Diana, Helena eams the sympathy of the girl’s mother
and negotiates their involvement in the execution of a bed-trick, which “i1n fine,
delivers me to fil the time, / Herselfmost chastely absent” (3.7.33-4). Towards the end
of the play Helena is mostly missing and has barely any unes because, of course,
Parolles is nowhere nearby; instead, the fruits of her labours speak for themselves, as
the supposedly impossible written conditions for Bertram’s return are met — in Diana’s
delivery of the family ring “which shah neyer corne off’ Bertram’s finger, and in the
revelation of the coming “child begotten of [Helena’sj body that [Bertram is] father to”
(3.2.50-2). In the final scene, Helena appears to daim her husband, and Bertram
—
having been “doubly won” by language and circumstance
— instantaneously surrenders
and promises to “love her deanly, ever, ever deariy” (5.3.305). Symbolized in tlie
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unbom child are the union of man and women, and the restoration of moral and social
order in the play. Within the fictional world of the drama, Helena and ber rhetoric have
single-handedly engineered the final outcome of the play. While that might be
considered paradoxical by Renaissance social standards, we recaïl that “all’s well that
ends well” in this fictional society, and so there is no harm, no foul.
Yet the question remains: how is any social acceptance of this unabashed Lady
Rhetoric even possible? $ignificantly, Parolles does not get off quite as easily as Helena
in Ail ‘s WeÏÏ. Just as the wayward Bertram is tricked into assuming his proper place in
the order of things, so is Parolles
— that great delinquent
— set up to take a fail. For the
greater part of the play, Parolles’ comic character is robust, serving to keep his
surroundings in a camivalesque state. He banters constantly with the lord Lafew and the
fool Lavatch, both of whom see right though his grandstanding, parasitic ways. He
coaxes Bertram to flee ah of his familial duties and run off to war, and when away, he
encourages his friend to commit adultery. Fie is referred to as a “vile rascal,” an
“infinite and endless liar”, and a “poor, decayed, ingenious, foolish, rascally knave”
(3.4.84; 5.2.24-5; 3.6.10). He is manipulative, licentious, and a terrible influence on
Bertram. Yet, in “A Vindication of Parolles,” Rothman questions Parolles’ supposed
villainy: “Is he a genuine Vice, malevolent and odious?” (183) Despite his faults,
Parolles simply does not seem to be inherently evil, but only mischievous and
humorous. So why exactly must he be punished? As Rothman explains, “[a] pact exists
between the playwright and the audience, in that the stock figure of the braggart soldier
— and Parolles is one
— must be realizcd in humor and ineffectuahity. As a braggart he
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must be gulled and/or beaten
— and Parolles is” (184). Tndeed, Parolles is socially,
morally, and dramatically bound to pay for his deiinquency.
However, given the simuitaneously vital literary functions of Parolles” character
as comedic villain and symbol of language, I submit that Paroiles’ bad behavior is flot
the only reason for his downfall. Metadramaticaliy, the fate of his character signais the
reduced rhetoricai capacity of speech, and the disarmed state of language at the end of
Ail ‘s Well That Ends Well, and it is these adjustments which ultimateiy aliow this
comedy to satisfy its own structural and social prerequisites. Away at war, Parolles’
comrades begin to suspect that he is dishonest, and worse, capable of being disloyal to
them. To trick him, they capture and blindfold him and pretend to be enemy soidiers
who do flot speak his language. Afraid of torture and desperately unable to
communicate, Parolles begins to divulge army secrets and seli out bis own officers with
ironic accusations of iying and cowardice. Having revealed his true colours, a blindfold
is removed from Parolles’ eyes, and he is “undone” (4.3.270). In what is arguably bis
funniest moment, Parolles laments his sealed fate: “Who cannot be crush’d with a
plot?” (4.3.272). Jeremy Richard argues that this instance contains Paroiles’ pathos and
“tragic awareness” — that “language is unmasked as a faulty medium for conveying
truth” (155, 146). I would argue that it is actualiy a sendup to the piay’s Master
Crafisman — a comic reminder of Shakespeare’s hand in ail structures dramatic and
linguistic.
Problematically, in transgressing the barrier between the play and reality,
Parolles now undermines the integrity of the fictional world in Ail ‘s Well. Shakespeare
must, therefore, neutralize the braggart — the evidence of his own artistry that is now far
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too obvious by dramatic standards
— to further honor his “pact” with the audience and
give them an ending befitting a comedy. With the blindfold off, Parolles sees the error
of bis obnoxious, coimiving ways. Grateful for his life, he decides to reforrn:
Captain I’!! be no more,
But I will eat, and drink, and sieep as soft
As Captain shah. Sirnply the thing I am
Shah make me live. Who knows himself a braggart,
Let him fear this; for it will corne to pass
That every braggart shah be found an ass.
Rust sword, cool blushes, and, Parolles, live
Safest in shame: being fooled, by fool’ry thrive.
There’s place and means for every man alive.
I’ll after them. (4.3.278-8 7)
In deciding to hive “simply” as a man and a fool, Parolles surrenders his metaphoric role
(as “speech”) to his metonyrnic and literai ones (as “hanguage,” and a dramatic
character) — a gesture that represents flot the faihure of language, as Richard argues, but
the defiation of hanguage. The world of Ail ‘s Weii is now free to setthe down, and ail
characters may assume their rightfuh positions in the moral and social order, and the
Renaissance audience can be pleased. The reformed Parolies can be a fool in the King’s
court, courtesy of Lafew. Bertram, also reformed, can be a ioving husband, a father, and
a responsible royal. Hehena too can be what she aiways wanted to be — Bertram’s
beioved wife and the mother of their chuld. However, in the tradition of the
Shakespearean “problern comedy,” even though alh seems wehl, the imagination has
been purposefuily and cheverly disturbed. Heiena’s agency has gone unpunished and her
identity is intact. Helena’s rhetoric, which she acquires from Parolles (as “speech”) and
then masters, does the work of manipulating the characters around ber to achieve her
goals and fulfihi her desires. At the same time, Parolles (as “language”) creates the
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linguistic and social conditions for Helena’s ultimate survival as a feminine female
rhetorician at the end ofAlÏ ‘s WelÏ.
It is ultimately Helena’s unique relationship with language that allows her to
resist the standard fate of Lady Rhetoric, thus encouraging and enabling a theory of
rhetorical identity and Shakespearean female characterization based on her exampie.
Certainly, Ail ‘s Well That Ends Well provides a particularly hospitable literary
environment for her character and goals. It is a play full of strong language, strong
women, and strong purpose. Susan Snyder, in the Oxford Shakespeare edition, notes
Robertson Davies’ observation that “the Countess is the oniy female character to open a
Shakespearean play... if we except the First Witch in Macbeth, jwhich} suggests the
importance of women and their initiatives in this play” (79, fn. I). Helena, in the image
of Queen Elizabeth I, is exceptionally gified, and Shakespeare is the Calvinian “Divine
authority” that has graced her with the rhetoric to thrive within her drama and outlast it.
As the King of France says to Helena as she woos him into her care, “[m]ethinks in thee
some blessed spirit doth speak / Ris powerful sound within an organ weak” (2.1.171-2).
However, Christy Desmet explains that, on the level of character criticism, “a skeptical
analysis of Helena’s encounter with the French King, one that keeps in mmd her
romantic goal, suggests that she insinuates herself into a male political hierarchy by
adopting and transforming its discourse” (159). Desmet’s insight crucially reaffirms the
practical significance of Helena’s symbolic joumey for this project. After ail, in
dramatic, literary, and scholarly worlds alike, exceptions to rules do flot change those
ruies by divine authority alone, but through the methodology and praxis they inspire.
Chapter 3
Bridging the Comic-Tragic Female Gap:
Isabella, Desdemona, and Lady Macbeth
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Measure for Measure (1603) is considered to be one of Shakespeare’s “problem
plays”
— a distinction it shares with Troilus and Cressida (1601-2) and A il ‘s WeÏÏ That
Ends Well (1602-3). Whule critics have differentially included a variety of other plays in
this category, they have widely observed and agreed that, afier 1600, Shakespeare’s
comedies adopted a much more serious tone and began to debate problematic,
contemporary social issues onstage through their action and characters; resistant to their
own generic definition and classification as either comedies or tragedies, these plays
formed a sub-genre of Shakespearean drama that came to be critically acknowledged
and dubbed as “tragi-comedy.” The OED defines a tragic-comedy as “[aj play (or,
rarely, a story) combining the qualities of a tragedy and a comedy, or containing both
tragic and comic elements; sometimes spec. a play mainly oftragic character, but with a
happy ending” (“tragi-comedy”). In adhering rather strictly to these amalgamated
generic requirements, Measure for Measure serves as a pivotai break from
Shakespearean high comedy
— one that ushers in the most creative and prolific period in
Shakespeare’ s production of tragedy. This chapter will examine this generic shift from a
rhetorical perspective, by examining three female figures
— Measure for Measure’s
Isabella, Othelto’s Desdemona, and Lady Macbeth
— who are all “problematic” in their
outspokenness, and who together form a bridge between Shakespearean comedy and
tragedy, thus demonstrating the crucial influence that dramatic genre has on the
construction and the identity of the rhetorical female character.
While Isabella is both extremely abie and highiy encouraged to apply her
rhetorical skills
— and to speak publicly as a woman in Measure for Measure — hers is
essentially a rhetorical service that is employed by the men around her to achieve their
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own goals. Regardiess, she is both eloquent and effective in ber character society, and
the combative nature of her speech signais an inherent conflict between the moraiity
and indepcndence of her own character, and the controlling male world within which
she is forced to function. Desdemona, as both the object and the agent of rhetoric in
Othello (1603-4), struggles against a host of and male wills and voices to participate in
the construction of lier own character identity. While her words are ultimately
unappreciated and unheard by her male counterparts, Desdemona’s rhetoricai efforts are
flot in vain, in that they fashion a spirited, loyal, honest, and sympathetic character who,
in her martyred death, rises symbolicaily above the unjust dramatic circumstances that
kiil her. Lady Macbeth in tum represents perhaps the most vivid and sensational
example of how destructive female rhetoric can be to a character society, and how self-
destructive that rhetoric can then be for the female character herself. Going against
everything that is deemed naturai and appropriate for a woman
— both rhetoricaily and
sociaiiy
— Lady Macbeth becomes the ultimate transgressor and subvertor of Eariy
Modem gender roles, to the point where her character’s speech and self achieve a
figurative androgyny in Macbeth (1606). While she must, and indeed does suffer and
die for lier violent misdeeds and gender-role contravention, the image of Lady Macbeth
retains an astonishing potency which is arguabiy unparalleied among Shakespeare’s
ieading ladies. The disparate rhetoricai identities of these three femaie figures force us
to examine the dramatic conditions that bring them into existence and shape them, and
to appreciate how they manage, against ail structural odds, to persist as aesthetically
marvellous characters.
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With its own contradictory themes of lust and chastity, immorality and ethics,
punishment and mercy, death and marnage, and with its own solemn, dramatic
progression resulting in a re!atively jovial denouement, Measure for Measure rather
exemplifies its own generic crossbreeding
— its plot entailing the following sequence of
events. A young, chaste, and virtuous maid, about become a nun (Isabella), is forced to
plead with a pious, tyrannical deputy (Angelo) for the life of her brother (C!audio), who
has been sentenced to death for having pre-marital relations with his now pregnant,
common-law fiancé. When Angelo presents Isabella with a villainous proposition
— her
virginity given to him in excliange for lier brother’s life
— Isabella and Vienna’s noble
Duke, who disguises himself as a friar in order to observe the judicial goings-on in his
kingdom, plot and toi! to expose Angelo’s corruption. Angelo’s downfall is secured by
way of a bed-trick involving his former betrothed, Mariana, whom lie once wrongfully
abandoned, and is finally forced by the Duke to marry. The play ends with the Duke’s
proposai of marnage to Isabelia, which is met with a cnitically-provocative silence.
Remarkably, as the central figure in this problematic, tragicomic tale, Isabella’s rhetoric
itself tends to bestnide the generic gap between comedy and tragedy, and to incorporate
the tension between those two dramatic forms in their varied acceptance and treatrnent
of the rhetonical female. Whule Isabella is initialÏy praised for lier rhetonical proficiency,
and is encounaged to speak openly and publicly as a woman throughout the play, her
manner of speech is necessari!y limited and directed by male objectives and instruction,
and lier speaking ultimately serves the play in re-establishing the male social order
—
which may very well include, in the end, her own wifely subservience. Regardiess, lier
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speech is the undisputable catalyst of Measure for Measure, and as such begs to be
examined for its own rhetorical strength.
“The tongue of Isabel,” as the Duke of Vienna cails it (4.3.105), inspires no
shortage of admiration for the men in Isabella’s character society. Indeed, every single
one of the principle male figures in the play recognizes and defers to Isabella’s
rhetorical proficiency as a force to be reckoned with
— and to be employed. from
prison, Claudio instructs his friend Lucio to seek out his sister to aid him in his current,
dire situation; in so doing, he describes lier extraordinary abilities in the reaims of
rhetoric and logic:
This day my sister shouïd the cloister enter,
And there receive her approbation.
Acquaint her with the danger of my state,
Implore lier, in my voice, that she make friends
To the strict deputy; bid herselfassay him.
I have great hope in that, for in her youth
There is a prone and speechless dialect
Such as move men; beside, she hath prosperous art
When she will play with reason and discourse,
And well she can persuade. (1.2. 173-84)
It is worth noting here that, while Claudio praises Isabella’s speaking as a “prosperous
art,” he also attests to a “prone and speechless dialect” in lier youthful demeanor that
has the capacity to “move men.” This recognition of her persuasiveness in silence as
well as in speech is crucial in signifying that Isabella is, by lier very nature, compelling
and convincing; it also suggests that Isabella is inherently commanding of lier own
rhetoric
— that is, that she embodies it. Unfortunately, Isabella is unaware of lier own
innate rhetorical gifis, for when she is asked by Lucio to use her “fair prayer / To soflen
Angelo” (1.4.69-70), she does not realize what means she lias to help lier brother:
ISABELLA. Alas, what poor ability’s in me
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b do him good?
LUCIO. Assay the power you have.
ISABELLA. My power, alas, I doubt. (1.4.74-6)
In the instant of expressing lier own reservations and insecurity, Isabefla leaves herseif
vuinerable to Lucio’s manipulation of her rhetoric. He instructs ber to beg like a
woman:
Go to Lord Angelo
And let him learn to know, when maidens sue
Men give like gods; but when they weep and kneel
Ail their petitions are as freely theirs
As they themselves would owe them. (1.4.79-83).
Lucio is here suggesting that Isabella will be most effective in persuading Angelo if she
displays her feminine emotionality and subservience before him. Significantly, while
that implication might seem to degrade her, it also ensures that Isabeila is flot merely
being permitted to plead her case publicly as a woman, but that she is being explicitly
ordered to do so.
Act 2, Scene 2 of Measurefor Measure comprises a rhetorical stand-off between
Isabella and Angelo, and the verbal encounter during which the truc dispositions of
these two characters are revealed. Instead of basely begging for her brother’s life in a
“womanly” fashion, Isabella engages in a lengthy judicial debate with Angelo as to the
nature and severity of her brother’s crime, and as to the importance of mercy in the
administering of justice. Isabella initially attempts to win Angelo’s favor by mirroring
his values and admitting her own genuine disapproval of lier brotlier’s behavior. She
then asks quite simply for her brother’s otherwise-good person to be disassociated from
bis criminal act:
There is a vice that most I do abhor,
And most desire should meet the blow ofjustice;
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For which T would not pÏead, but that I must,
for which I must flot plead, but that I am
At war ‘twixt will and will flot...
I have a brother is condemned to die.
I do beseech you, let it be his fault,
And flot my brother. (2.2.29-34, 3 5-6)
When Angelo asserts that he cannot “[cJondemn the fault, and flot the actor of it”
(2.2.37), Isabella, according to her own moral code, cannot help but concur that
Angelo’s is a just but severe law” (2.2.41), and in fact she is ready to leave her
argument there. However, with Lucio coaching her from the sidelines, and telling lier
that lier entreaty is “too cold” (2.2.56), Isabella takes a new approach, and shifts her
argument into a description of clemency as a divine and Cbrist-like deed
— one tliat
would flatter Angelo in his performance of it:
No ceremony tliat to great ones longs,
Not the king’s crown, nor the deputed sword,
The marshal’s truncheon, nor thejudge’s robe,
Become them with one liaif so good a grace
As mercy does...
Why, ah the souls that were forfeit once,
And He that might the vantage best have took
found out the remedy. How would you be
1f He whicli is the top ofjudgement should
But judge as you are? O, think on that,
And mercy then will breatlie within your hips
Like a man new made. (2.2.60-3, 73-9)
She asks Angelo to rethink the gravity of her brother’s crime: “Who is it that hath died
for this offence? / There’s many have committed it” (2.2.88-9). When Angelo refuses to
“show some pity” (2.2.100), Isabella resorts to scoming him, by way of a series of
illustrative analogies and metaphors, for what she considers to be his blatant abuse of
lis deputed power and office: “O, it is excellent / To have a giant’s strength, but it is
tyrannous / To use it hike a giant [...J Great men may jest with saints; ‘tis wit in them, /
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But in the less, foui profanation [...] That in the captain’s but a choleric word, / Which
in the soldier is flat blasphemy” (2.2.108-10, 128-30, 132-3). In continuing to berate
and badger Angelo for his undeserved arrogance and unnecessary strictness, Isabella
incurs Lucio’s continued coaxing and praise of her in his asides to her, to the point
where he expresses his perceived certainty that “[Angeloj will relent” (2.2.126).
IsabeÏla’s rhetoric does indeed have a tremendous impact on Angelo, but flot the
kind that she anticipates. Intrigued by her persistent pursuit of his ieniency, Angelo asks
her why she is imposing “these sayings” upon him (2.2.136), to which she responds
with a final appeal to bis own buman nature:
Go to your bosom,
Knock there. and ask your heart what it dotli know
That’s like my brother’s fault; if it confess
A naturaÏ guiltiness, such as is his,
Let it flot sound a thought upon your tongue
Against my brother’s life. (2.2.138-43)
In this instant, Angelo experiences something of an epiphany, which comprises flot an
intellectual response to Isabella’s argument, but a physical reaction to her
argumentation. 11e is “moved,” flot by Isabella’s cause, but by the way she uses her
words: “She speaks, and ‘tis / Such sense that my sense breeds witli it” (2.2.144-5).
Angelo’s physical or sexual “sense” is in fact ignited by Isabella’s common “sense.”
While lie is flot at ail predisposed to accept the case she makes, he is effectively seduced
by lier rhetoric, and the lust lie feels as a resuit ironically proves the validity of her
daim, as well as the force of her language. Angelo, to whom the Duke refers as “[a]
man of stricture and firm abstinence” (1.2.12), is at once consumed with a “desire to
hear [Isabella] speak again” (2.2.181), and to destroy her virtue.
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That Angelo reacts to Isabella’s rhetorical victory over him by attacking her
chastity is flot at ail surprising in theoreticai terms. Dympna Callaghan asserts that in
Early Modem Engiand, “[c]hastity, silence and obedience were the three cardinal and
synonymous feminine virtues” (79). If we consider that the opposites of these traits
would have been “three cardinal and synonymous feminine sins,” then for a woman to
be outspoken was for her to be disobedient and unchaste. Desmet confirms this
speculation with her daim that in “exhibiting modesty by being voluble, Isabella is a
living paradox” (148). Angelo is unable to reconcile himself with “this virtuous maid I
Who subdues [him] quite” (2.2.188-9), and so he feels compelled to destroy her
integrity and chastity by debunking her own logic. Isabella, having argued against her
brother’s confinement and death sentence by claiming his sin to be a commonly
committed one, must now contend with being expected to commit that sin in order to
redeem her brother. Being forced, in Act 2, Scene 4, to choose between her chastity and
Claudio’s life, Isabella daims that “it were better a brother died at once / Than that a
sister by redeerning him I Should die for ever (107-9). In an effort to trap her, Angelo
exposes the hypocrisy in her current stance on extra-marital sexual relations:
ANGELO. You seemed of late to make the law a tyrant,
And rather proved the sliding ofyour brother
A merriment than a vice.
ISABELLA. O pardon me, my lord, it ofi fails out
b have what we would have. we speak not what we
mean.
I something do excuse the thing I hate
For his advantage that I dearly love. (2.4.115-21)
This exchange reveals the impossible position in which Isabella has been placed, and
the reality that, in speaking out on behalf of brother, her honor and her treasured values
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have been compromised. Angelo backs lier even further into lier corner by reminding
ber tliat she is in fact a woman, and should behave like one:
I do anest your words. 3e that you are,
That is, a woman; if you be more, you’re none.
If you be one, as you are weil expressed
By ail externai warrants, show it now
By putting on the destined livery. (2.4.135-9)
In the Oxford Shakespeare edition of the play, N.W. Bawcutt glosses this passage as
Angelo’s assertion that he wili “take [Isabella’s words] as security”; that if she tries to
be or do more than that of which a woman is “naturaiiy capable,” then she is no woman
at ail; that if she is the woman she is “cleariy shown to be by ail of the evidence of her
outward appearance,” then she must wear the “uniform of frailty which women are
destined to wear” (2.4.135-9 fn.; Measure for Measure 144). I argue that, given the
juxtaposition of the tropes of speech and sex in this play, and in the IsabellalAngelo
scenes in particular, Angelo is here asserting that he has the power to stop (“arrest”) lier
womaniy speaking aitogether; that if she attempts to speak out anyrnore (“be more”),
then she is no woman at ail; that if she is as well spoken (“weli expressed”) as she
appears to be, then she must duly surrender her right to her own chastity. In response to
AngeÏo’s sexuai doubie-taik, Isabelia immediately responds that “ha[s] no tongue but
one,” and “entreat[s]” Angeio to “speak the former [simple] language” with which he
once addressed her.
For the rest of the play, Isabella embarks upon a quest to protect ber own
chastity and, having no other choice, she trusts in the men around lier — that tliey will
help her to preserve her personal integrity. As each one ultimately betrays her, her
resistance against their will to dominate her reverberates in her speech and, finally, in
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her silence. In confessing her terrible predicament to Claudio
— whom she believes
“hath... in him such a mmd of honour” (2.4.180)
— he fearfuily begs her to sleep with
Angelo to save his life. Utteriy disgusted that her own brother would “be made a man
out of [her] vice” (3.1.141), Isabella launches into a hateful tirade against him:
Take my defiance,
Die, perisli! Might but my bending down
Reprieve thee from thy fate, it shouid proceed.
I’ll pray a thousand prayers for thy death,
No word to save thee. (3.1. 146-50)
Realizing that Claudio will flot defend her as she has defended him, Isabella decides
that she wiii no longer speak on his behaif Notably, afier this heated verbal exchange,
Isabella is immediately called over by the Duke, who has been listening on in lis friar
disguise. 11e teils Isabeila: “I would by and by have some speech with you. The
satisfaction I would require is likewise your own benefit” (3.1.158-60). Unbeknownst to
Isabeila, the “satisfaction” that the Duke “require[s]” is not only the exposure and
downfall of Angelo, and his own reestabiishment as the moral and rightful authority
figure in Vienna, but the eventual taking of Isabeila as his wife. In aliowing herseif to
be “directed” by the Duke (4.3.134) — both in the execution of the bed-trick invoiving
Mariana, and in the final scene where she, as instructed, “accuse[s] [Angelo] home and
home” (4.3.141) — Isabella is successful in securing her chastity and her good
reputation; however, she is also duped by the Duke, during that entire process, into
believing that her brother has been murdered, and that, in spite of ail of the horrors that
have befallen her, she will ultimately be allowed to “have” her “general honour”
(4.3 133). In his book, Speechless Dialect: Shakespeare ‘s Open Silences, Philip C.
McGuire recounts two pivotai incidents in the final scene of Measure for Measure, in
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reaction to which Isabella remains oddly suent: the first, when her brother is revealed as
being alive; the second, afier the Duke proposes marnage to her (78). When the Duke
reveals a living Claudio to the court, he says to Isabella:
If he be like your brother, for his sake
Is he pardoned, and for your lovely sake,
Give me your hand and say you will be mine,
He is my brother too
— but fitter time for that. (5.1.493-6)
McGuire suggests that there is a “potential ambivalence” in Isabeila’s final decision to
remain suent, particularly in light of the fact that, in that same final scene, Isabella finds
the compassion within her to speak on Angelo’s behalf for Mariana’s sake. Remarkably,
regarding Angeio’s evil purposes, she argues that “[h]is act did flot o’ertake his bad
intent” (5.1.451); in response the acts and intents of her brother and the Duke, she says
absolutely nothing at ah (72). McGuire wnites:
The silence between Claudio and Isabella may be tantamount to a
retraction of the bitter words they had earlier exchanged or — to pose
another possibility
— that silence may signify a continuing rupture in
their relationship... [It] coincides with the silence with which she
responds to the Duke’s initial proposal ofmarriage... Isabella’s silence is
all the more striking because the Duke phrases his marnage proposai as a
cail for her to assent with words as well as with a gesture... (79)
That the curtain falis on a suent Isabella is certainly no coincidence, considering that
Isabella has, for the entire play, betrayed her own personal tendency towards silence
—
as evidenced by her life-decision to become a nun
— in order to rhetorically serve her
male counterparts. In choosing, finally, flot to speak, Isabella asserts both her wihi to
remain independent, and her true identity as a chaste servant
— flot of any man, but of
God.
To decipher the rhetonical identity of the character of Desdemona is to
understand the peculiar nature of her character society, and the rhetonical forces that are
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at work against her in her cliaracter world. Indeed, Othello is perfectly suited to a
discussion of the rhetoric of character because of the manner in which societal and
individual rhetorics get twisted up together in a discourse of appearances1 in the play,
thereby convoluting the entire process of rhetorical characterization. In support of the
“bridge” I am attempting to build for the rhetoricat female between the dramatic genres,
Susan Snyder has argued that Othetlo is a tragedy built upon a “comic matrix,” meaning
that it initially employs the conventions of comedy
— including mismatched loyers,
elopement, misplaced objects, drunken brawls, and an impossibly evil Vice figure
— and
then evolves unexpectedly towards a tragic resolution (5). n keeping with this air of the
twisted and unpredictable, any attempts by characters in Othello to identify themselves
and each other are necessarily confounded by the various rhetorics that make up the
play’s character society. This condition destabilizes the entire society
— promising
disorder and terrible consequences for a supposedly “Honest lago” (2.3.158), and an
apparently “noble Moor” (2.3.121)
— meaning that its worst implications are for the
“virtuous Desdemona” (3.1 .3 3), whose character paradoxically operates just outside of
the main discourse of the play, while stiil figuring predominantly in its tragedy.
Throughout OthelÏo, Desdemona is subjected to a wide variety of rhetorical
constructions of her own character at the same time as she is endeavoring to participate
in that process by employing rhetorical devices of her own
— namely soliloquy,
dialogue, and even silence. Tragically, these various and opposing constructions resuit
in further diversification and confusion concerning the true nature and identity of lier
character, and Desdemona’s dual-function as a rhetorical object and agent is ultimately
My development ofthe term “discourse ofappearances” is rooted in Melchiori’s references to a
“dialectic of seeming versus being” in Othetlo (68,72).
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too divided and paradoxical a role for her to balance, or to survive. Nonetheless, in spite
of how her male counterparts attempt to negatively characterize her, it is Desdemona’s
own rhetorical efforts which ring most true in Othello, and leave the audience feeling
certain that she is the honest and loyal wife that she says she is.
As I have indicated, OthelÏo’s “aesthetic whole” (Melchiori 71) is devoted to a
discourse of appearances. Iago’s early admission, “I am not what I am” (1.1.66), and
Othello’s late request, “Speak of me as I am... / 0f one that loved not wisely but too
well” (5.2.338, 340), provide the framework for a society obsessed with perceptions of
character and their verbal renderings. With far fewer speeches and exchanges than these
two main characters, Desdemona is technically more of a figure in this discourse than a
factor. Notably, the fact that she is so “free of speech” (3.3.187) is considered among
her greatest “virtues” as they are outlined by Othello (and obviously expected ofwomen
in that society [3.3.186-8]). Having fewer opportunities to actively participate in the
main discourse, Desdemona’s character is frequently ascribed to her
— which is to say
that she is ofien objectified by the rhetoric of the men in her character society. While
this condition is to a certain extent understandable, it is nonetheless problematic in the
world of Othelto where nothing is allowed to be what it seems.
Over the course of the play, Desdemona collects “linguistic signifiers,” or types
of characters that oppose one another.2 As rhetorical object, she is portrayed as an inert
possession and as an active driving force; as an limocent victim and as a devious whore.
Indeed, the first impulse of the men around Desdemona is to refer to her as if she were a
mere possession. In fact, the language they use to describe her imposes such passivity
2 These terms are explained in, and borrowed ftom Harold Fisch’s article entitied “Character as Linguistic
Sign” (593-4).
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on lier tliat she ofien seems like luggage (Oriin 17$). BewiÏdered by ber initial
departure, Brabantio demands of Othello: “O thou foui thief, where hast thou stow’d my
daughter?”(1.2.62). She is described as “transported” to the Moor (1.1.123), and “ta’en
away” by him (1.3.78). At the Venetian court, the Duke orders lago to “fJetch
Desdemona hither” (1 .3.120), and for the trip to Cyprus, OtheÏio “assign[sÏ” bis wife to
Iago’s “conveyance” (1.3.2$1). Ironicaiiy, this widespread treatment of Desdemona as
possession is undermined by the agency that is at other times attributed to lier. Before
Desdemona arrives at court to testifr, Othello describes to the Senate the ‘appetite’ she
brought to their courtship
— how she would “seriousiy incline” (1 .3.145) to sit and listen
to the tales of bis adventures, and aiways “corne again, and witli a greedy ear / Devour
up [his] discourse” (1.3.148-9). He portrays Desdemona as present, aware, and even
active in the wooing process
— as having given him “a world of sighs” (1.3.158) and
openiy desired “such a mail” (1.3.162) as him. Othello seems to be attesting to their
union as a ‘marnage of the minds’: “She lov’d me for the dangers I had pass’d; / And I
lov’d her that she did pity them” (1.3.166-7). Otheiio’s description of Desdemona to
the Senate paints her flot just as a wiiiing participant but a driving force in their
marnage, and ciearly contradicts other constructions of her as an inanirnate object. The
notion of her agency, or rather her influence over Othello, is most inflated when lago
declares, “Our general’s wife is now the general” (2.3.286). And nowhere is the irony of
these opposing constructions more striking than in 2.1, where Cassio refers to
Desdemona as “our great captain’s captain” (une 74), infusing her irnage with power,
Several critics — including Mai-y Beth Rose and Lena Cowen Orlin
— have used this and other parts of
Otheîlo’s rhetoric to support their studies of Desdemona as warrior figure; we will explore how
Desdemona herseif contributes to that image shortly.
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only to strip it away in the next une by explaining how she has been “left” in Iago’s
“conduct” (une 75).
Desdemona’s function as rhetorical object exposes her to another, more serious
set of opposing constructions
— those of ‘innocent victim’ and ‘devious whore.’ Before
she steps in to prove otherwise, Desdemona’s father presents her as “a maiden neyer
bold, /0f spirit so stiil and quiet that her motion / Blush’[s] at herseif’ (1.3.94-96), and
“[s]o opposite to marnage, that she shunn’d / The wealthy curled darlings of our nation”
(1.2.67-8). He rages, “She is abus’d, stol’n from me, and corrupted, / By speils and
medicines bought of mountebacks” (1.3.60-1), insisting that she must have been
drugged by Othello to behave so totaily out of character. It is ironic that our first ideas
of Desdemona should be those of an innocent maiden who has fallen victim to the “foui
charms” (1.2.73) of an evil apothecary. Afier ail, not only is that the image she most
ardently projects in her own rhetoric, it is
— considering the explicit and purposeful
effects oflago’s “medicine” (4.1.43)
— the image that seems to be the most appropriate
to her character. 0f course, that irony is itself subverted by the fact that Desdemona is
also rhetorically constructed as woman capable of some deception. In leaming of her
active role in their elopement, Brabantio wams Othello: “Look to her, Moor, if thou
hast eyes to see: / She has deceiv’d her father, and may thee” (1.3.288-9). lago later
echoes this warning: “She did deceive her father, marrying you; / And when she seem’d
to shake and fear your looks, / She iov’d them most” (3.3.207-9). Those warnings are
fertile ground for the most corrosive treatment of her character as a “whore,”
particularly after Desdemona decides to conceal the fact of her missing handkerchief in
order to placate her husband. As Othello’s faith is increasingly undermined by Iago’s
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insinuations of Desdemona’s infidelity, his formerly controlled rhetoric disintegrates,
becoming “starting” and “rash” (3.4.75), and the language lie uses to describe her
deteriorates. The once “gentle” (1.2.25), “fair” (2.1.173), “lady” (1.3.115), and “wife”
(1.3.233) Desdemona is now referred to as “chuck” (4.2.23), “devil” (4.1.230),
“cunning whore” (4.2.88), “procreant” (4.2.27), “public commoner” (4.2.72), and
“impudent stmmpet” (4.2.79). With flot even her own father to recommend lier,
Desdemona is left witli littie defense against this verbal thrashing and its implications.
As a rhetorical object, Desdemona is fashioned into various, opposing characters
— some more potent and toxic than others within lier male-dorninated character society.
Simultaneously, as rhetorical agent, Desdemona endeavors to participate in the
construction of her own character and employs certain devices to that end. In soliloquy,
Desdemona presents herself as a something of a soldier, while her dialogue functions to
uphold her reputation as a gentiewoman. When ail other words have failed her,
Desdemona resorts to the rhetoric of silence in a final, desperate, and ironically
successful attempt to construct lierseif.
If Othello presents their union as a marnage of the minds in the first act,
Desdemona most certainly echoes that notion in her own soliloquies. In fact,
Desdemona’s few poignant speeches are littered with soldierly rhetoric and references
to herseif as a kind of warnior spinit, and Othello himself hails his wife as his “fair
warnior” (2.1.173). Before the Venetian senate, Desdemona testifies as to militaristic
nature of her first feelings of love for Othello, and lier profound allegiance to him in bis
life and duties as a soldier — those which she daims the niglit to share with him:
That I did love the Moor to bye with him,
My downright violence and storm of fortunes
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May trumpet to the world...
I saw Othello’s visage in his mmd;
And to hjs honours and his valiant parts
Did I my soul and fortunes consecrate.
So that, dear lords, if I be lefi behind
A moth of peace, and he go to the war,
The rites for which I love him are bereft me,
And I a heavy interim shail support
By his dear absence. Let me go with him. (1.3.244-46, 24$-55).
According to Mary Beth Rose, with this speech “Desdemona characterizes herself as a
soldier-spouse, adopting the vocabulary ofthe epic quest” (217). While the “rites” she
requests are certainly her marnage (i.e. sexual) rites, and she openly expresses her
desire to go with her husband into the battlefield so that she can 5e with him in every
sense. This trope is continued in 3.4. when she stemly rebukes herseif for having
challenged Othello’s anger over the handkerchief, and invokes the imagery ofa military
court to express her own guilt: “I was
— unhandsome warrior as I am
— / Arraigning his
unkindness with my soul; / But now I find T had suborn’d the witness, / And he’s
indicted falsely” (3.4.145-8). The idea of ber soldierly obedience is most strongly
supported by her speech in 4.2. Although she realizes that she fighting a losing battie
against an unknown enemy (lago), she is resolved to be loyal to Othello at ail costs. She
swears to lago himself:
If e’er my wilÏ did trespass ‘gainst his love
Either in discourse of thought or in actual deed;
Or that mine eyes, mine ears, or any sense
Delighted them in any other form;
Or that I do not yet, and neyer did,
And ever will
— though he do shake me off
To beggariy divorcement — love him dearly,
Comfort forswear me! Unkindness may do much,
And his unkindness may defeat my life,
But neyer taint my love. (4.2.15 1-60)
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As evidenced by this speech, Desdemona possesses a profound sense of loyalty towards
Othello. In a terrible foreshadowing ofthe events to come, Desdemona declares that she
will neyer betray lier husband
— flot even if lie sees fit to kili ber.
In contrast to lier longer speeches, these potent, warrior-like images are not to be
found in Desdemona’s regular dialogue. If, according to Karen Newman’s theories,
these longer speeches “communicate [Desdemona’sJ mental life” (4), ber shorter
exchanges seem to serve more to uphold the status quo and preserve ber reputation as a
Venetian genflewoman within her character society. Perhaps the best example of this is
in 2.1, where Desdemona and lago, having retumed from Cyprus, engage in idle banter
as they wait for Othello on the docks of Venice. After having successfully violated
numerous social prescriptions for women in “half-wooing” Othello (1.3.174), running
off to marry him, and then electîng to accompany him to the battlegrounds of Cyprus,
Desdemona uses this retum home to try and reinforce her genteel, upper-class status.
While lago makes crude jokes and insulting character sketches of female virtues and
vices, Desdemona, despite feeling anxious, laughs at him good-naturedly and
challenges him only superficially. In a short aside — a sort of dialogue with the audience
— she confesses to the ruse: “I am flot merry; but I do beguile I The thing I am by
seeming otherwise” (2.1.121-2). This aside proves Desdemona’ s acute awareness of the
need for image-control in this society. That understanding is also shown in lier defense
of Emilia, whom lago chastizes for taiking too much. Desdemona declares, “Alas, she
has no speech!”(2. 1.103), suggesting once again that, in this character society, the best
rhetoric for a woman may be no rhetoric at ah.
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In fact, Desdemona ultimately resorts to a non-rhetorical rhetoric in a final
attempt to support and defend her own character
— the rhetoric of silence. When ail of
her attempts to portray her own character as both a dutiful wife and a respectable lady
have failed, and ail of her pleas and promises of iimocence have been exhausted,
Desdemona withdraws from those forms of rhetoric. In ‘A moving Rhetoricke,’
Christina Luckyj daims that “{f]eminine silence can be constructed as a space of
subjective agency which threatens masculine authority” (60). Desdemona’s is a
figurative silence, which is to say that it is flot so much non-verbal or non
argumentative as it is passive-aggressive. It includes the decision she makes, in the face
of an impending. unjust demise, to sunender her own words and sing the “song of
willow”
— one that another forsaken woman, her mother’s rnaid Barbary, sang to
“expre[ss] her fortune” (4.3.25, 27. 28). It also includes her decision to devote her very
last verbal effort to keeping Othello from being irnplicated in her murder. Though she
swears to Othello in her final moments, “I neyer did / Offend you in my life” (5.2.58-9),
he utterly refuses to accept her testimony, and the most solid proof of her loyaity cornes
only afier he has smothered her. Her last words uttered to a horrified Ernilia:
EMILIA. O, lady, speak again!
Sweet, Desdemona, O sweet rnistress, speak!
DESDEMONA. A guiItless death I die.
EMILIA. O, who hath done this deed?
DESDEMONA. Nobody; I rnyself Farewell.
Commend me to my kind lord. O fareweil! (She dies) (5.2.12 1-6)
These final speech acts of Desdemona’s are so entirely self-effacing and self
undermining, that it is difficuit to argue that they serve any purpose or prove any point
at ail (Oriin 181), and indeed they do flot within the drama of OtheÏlo: Othello is still
““The WiIlow Song”: Othello 4.3.38-53.
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undone, and now ail of Desdemona’s efforts to construct her own character have been
completeiy undermined. In Wooing, Wedding and Power: Women in Shakespeare ‘s
Plays, Irene Dash contends that “[Othelioj is the tragedy of a woman, of women,
pummeied into shape by the conventions that bind” (104). That argument has some
ment, but if we re-examine its daim in terms of the rhetoricai constructions of
Desdemona’s character, we see that it is oniy partially tme; being treated as the object
of language and being largely exciuded from the process of her own charactenization is
Desdemona’s necessary, dramatic fate — it is ber literai tragedy. Metadramaticaily,
however, Desdemona’s rhetorical efforts to “shape” herseif do flot go unheard or
unseen. They form the very iast
— and the iasting
— impressions that the audience has of
her character: images of a forsaken wife, a failen soldier, and even a martyred saint.
IfMeasurefor Measure is a tragicomedy, and Othello is a tragedy with a “comic
matrix,” Macbeth is a tragedy, through and through. With its murder and madness.
ghosts and gore, Macbeth is a horrific spectacle which includes ail of the necessary
ingredients to properly thriil an audience — including. of course, a freakishiy-vioient and
outrageously-vocai female who suffers crueiiy for the potency of her rhetoricai identity.
In Chapter 1, I state that “any female appropriation of the art of rhetoric Eanly Modem
society was tantamount to her physically wandering beyond the private, domestic
sphere to which she was relegated, and into the masculine, public reaims of poiitics and
war — it was an aberration, and a violation of gender-appropniate behavior. For a wornan
to speak out at ail, she had to be speaking the language of men” (15). If any one
Shakespearean female character can be described as being the most rhetoricaily deviant,
physically transgressive, and gender-inappropniate, it is the murderous Queen of
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Scotiand, Lady Macbeth. Lady Macbeth’s grisly, ambitious, and ultimately successful
endeavor to secure the throne of Scotiand for her husband involves her character’s bold
performance of both a literai and a rhetorical usurpation. Her obtaining for her husband
the kingship that is flot rightfully his signais lier intrusion into the matters of men —
those of politics and war — and her unlawful seizure and appropriation of the language
and they physicai means that belong to them.
While the drama of Macbeth has been widely criticized for lacking the thematic
complexity and the profound character development of other Shakespearean tragedies,
such as Hamiet and Othello, the play’s topical and linguistic straightforwardness is
useful in its construction of very clear and uncomplicated characters. Whule this
phenomenon is, on the one hand, responsible for the terrific vivacity of the figure of
Lady Macbeth, h also rather cements the fate of ber spectacular character. According to
the theory of rhetorical identity, it wouid appear that the sharper the female character
image, the greater the evidence of female agency and subjectivity; the greater the
evidence of female agency and subjectivity, the greater the need for its repression and
destruction. Indeed, Lady Macbeth is one of the most violent and vocal of
Shakespeare’s females, and those male qualities construct for her a rhetorical identity
that is intrepid to the point of being androgynous; of course, such rhetoricai audacity on
the part of woman cannot go unpunished on the Early Modem stage, and so Lady
Macbeth’s character is subject to a forcible descent into madness, and lier language is
systemicaliy reduced from powerful and persuasive soliloquies and speeches, through
subservient, wifely pleas, and mindless and shameful sleep-talking, to a suicide
heralded by a cry — not of her own, but of other women.
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I have shown that because of the numerous and diverse rhetorical constructions
of the character of Desdemona, there is a challenge in sorting out which of those
characterizations represent her truc identity in Othetto; even Desdemona uses various
types of rhetoric to shape herseif, thereby forming and presenting a complex figure of
herseif. Such is flot the case with Lady Macbeth. Her rhetoric characterizes ber rather
singularly as a power-hungry, blood-thirsty warrior-woman, and in fact, ah signs in
Macbeth point to that characterization as being the right one. In Act 2, Scene 2 of
Macbeth, the Thane of Rosse refers to Macbeth as “Behlona’s bridegroom” (line 54).
Behlona is, of course, the goddess of war in Roman mythology, who was said to walk
directly beside Mars. the god of war (the Greek god Ares) in battie, the two of them
leaving the earth behind them streaming with blood (Hamilton 34). Though Rosse’s
words might. at first, seem to be an appraisal of Macbeth’s mihitary prowess
— an
indication of how intricately the quahities of despotism and violence are woven into his
character
— they can also be taken as an assertion of the truc nature and role of his
spouse, Lady Macbeth. Applying the pseudonym of “Bellona” to Macbeth’s wife not
only allows us to liken Lady Macbeth to a priestess or goddess of war, but it encourages
us to assess the extent to which her character’s rhetoric and actions uphold that image
and support that characterization of lier.
Using her own speech as her main weapon, Lady Macbeth wills herseif into
combat against what is deemed “natural” for a woman in her character society, and she
does so with the specific intent of rendering herseif capable of murder. The theme of
nature being grossiy disturbed
— to the point where “[f]air is foui, and foui is fair”
(1.1.12)
— is crucial in Macbeth, for it secures the proper conditions for cvii and disorder
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to easily intrude upon the lives of the characters and corrupt them. The theme of the
ftightening abnormaÏity of gender disturbance and sexuai ambiguity in this play is first
invoked during Macbeth and Banquo’s initial encounter with the witches
—
appropriately nicknamed “the Weïrd sisters” (1.3.33)
— and right after Macbeth lias
described the day as both “foui and fair” (1.3.39). Banquo’s says of the hags: “You
should be women, / And yet your beards forbid me to interpret / That you are so”
(1.3.47-9). This allusion to physical androgyny in fact sets the stage for Lady Macbeth’s
psychological adoption of masculinity (Adelman 111), that which is most strongiy
evidenced by her famous speech in Act 1, Scene 5. Once she ieams ofthe future that the
witches have prophesied for her husband, she cails upon the evil spirits that be to relieve
her of her femininity so that she might do what is necessary to make Macbeth’s
prospects become realities:
Corne, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fil! me from crown to the toe top-full
0f direst cruelty. Make thick my blood,
Stop up th’ access and passage to remorse,
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fel! purpose, nor keep peace between
Th’ effect and it! Corne to my woman’s breasts,
And take my milk for gali, you murd’ring ministers.
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature’s mischief. (1.5.47-57)
Duncan, the King of Scotiand, will make a “fatal entrance... [u]nder [her] battlements”
that night (1.5.46-7), and this speech serves as Lady Macbeth’s rallying cry to herseif—
an assurance that no aspects of her own womanhood will distract her from lier purpose.
The resuit of this, Angela Pitt explains, is that Lady Macbeth cornes to demonstrate
— or
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rather, to betray of herseif
— “characteristics that are traditionally helU to be possible
only in the male
— single-minded courage and cruelty” (66).
In fact, what constitutes a man is one of the play’s central concems, and
certainly one of Lady Macbeth’s. When she first receives the letter from her husband,
telling her of the witches’ sayings, she privately expresses her concem that Macbeth
simply does flot have, in his character, the necessary ruthlessness to make those sayings
corne true; she believes that he is flot, as it were, ‘man enough’:
Glamis thou art, and Cawdor, and shait be
What thou art promised. Yet I do fear thy nature;
It is too full o’ th’ rnilk of human kindness
b catch the nearest way. Thou would’st be great,
Art flot without ambition, but without
The illness that should attend it. (1.5.15-20)
Lady Macbeth knows that she possesses, within her own character, the qualities that her
husband lacks, and she explicitly states her intention to berate him for his weaknesses,
and to impart to him, through her speech, her own will and capabilities: “Hie thee
hither, / That I may pour my spirits in thine ear / And chastise with the valor of my
tongue / Ah that impedes thee from the golden round” (1.5.28-31). With an acute sense
ofthe goodly impression that they need to give their guests, and the hostility and human
disregard that their open show of ftiendliness must mask, Lady Macbeth instructs lier
husband as to how they must first ‘perform’ for their compafly, so that they can then
perform the murder:
Your face, my thane, is as a book where men
May read strange matters. To beguile the time,
Look hike the time. Bear welcome in your eye,
Your hand, your tongue. Look hike th’ innocent flower,
But be the serpent under’t. He that’s coming
Must be provided for, and you shah put
This night’s great business into my dispatch,
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Which shah to ail our nights and days to corne
Give solely sovereign sway and masterdom. (1.6.73-82)
Interestingly, Macbeth here teils her that they “will speak further” about this rnatter, and
Lady Macbeth disrnisses him: “Only look up clear. / To alter favour ever is to fear. /
Leave ail the rest to me” (1.6.82-4). This rebuke indicates rather forcefuhly that she is
now the man in charge, and that the only speech that rnatters now is hers.
Lady Macbeth’s rhetoric in fact continues to be characterized by a trope of
masculinity, and as the play progresses she goes on to make several attacks upon ber
husband’s manliness
— the most forceful of which occurs when he tries to back out of
their plan to murder the king. Macbeth daims, in his own defense, “I dare do ail that
may become a man; / Who dares do more is none” (1.7.51-2). However, as Dusinberre
daims, while “[tJhe witches work on Macbeth’s image of himself as king[,] Lady
Macbeth works on his image of himself as mail” (283). She does flot stand for his fear,
and her lack of womanly impulses becomes increasingly apparent as she taunts
Macbeth, and compares her own courage and determination to lis:
When you durst do it, then you were a man;
And to be more than what you were, you would
Be so mucli more the man...
.1 have given suck, and know,
How tender ‘tis to love the babe that milks me;
I would, while it was smiling in my face,
Have pluck’d my nipple from his boneless gums,
And dash’d the brains out, had I so swom as you
Have done to this. (1.7.56-9, 62-7)
This is Lady Macbeth’s first and only verbal aclmowledgment of her own womanhood
in the entire play of Macbeth. Given that there is no other indication of the Macbeths
having had any chiidren between them, one presumes that the child she mentions in this
passage is dead — leaving one to wonder how such an event may have shaped her
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character’s distorted psychology. Nonetheless, lier speech indicates that no womanly
aspect, flot even the bond of motherhood
— could ever have made lier break any promise
to her husband, let alone such an important and consequential one. It is a statement
which proves that the violence in her character is indeed inherent, and not to be
dismissed by Macbeth or by her audience as merely a passing fancy. When Macbeth
retums from murdering Duncan
— delirious, and having forgotten to leave the bloody
daggers behind with the king’s grooms, to frarne them for the crime — Lady Macbeth
scoms him for being “[iJnfirm of purpose” (2.2.68), and goes back to finish the job that
he started.
In the rnidst of committing their gruesome act, and with his wife as the instigator
of it, Macbeth declares that “nature seems dead” (2.1.62), and the truth in that
observation is reflected throughout the rest of the play in the deterioration of Macbeth’s
relationship with his wife, and in the decline and eventual death of Lady Macbeth.
Having reversed their gender roles so perversely, the Macbeths’ marnage is irrevocably
altered. The horror of what they have done affects them both; however, Lady Macbeth
maintains her feminine composure enough to preserve her courtly status and appearance
as a “gentie lady” (2.3.96), while Macbeth loses his own to the point where his wife
declares him to be “unmann’d in folly” (3.4.87). As Macbeth loses his sanity as a part
of the afiermath of their crime, so does lie lose the respect and love he once feit for his
wife. While he initially admired her ability to shake off lier female weakness, telling her
that she should “[b]ring fortli men-children only! / For thy undaunted mettie should
compose / Nothing but males” (1.7.83-5), he begins to realize that there is “[n]o son of
[his] succeeding” (3.1.69). Macbeth cornes to see Lady Macbeth in the context of his
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own reign
— as “fruitless” and “barren” (3.1.66, 67). flaving made use of Lady
Macbeth’s evil instruction and warped constitution to get his crown, Macbeth ends up
resenting lier and alienating lier in lis desperate attempts to keep it.
As Macbeth’s state of mmd and the state of their union disintegrate, Lady
Macbeth goes to great lengths to ‘keep up appearances’ at court by behaving in a more
womanly and wifely fashion. As they prepare for the banquet where they will celebrate
their coronations, Macbeth is deeply unsettled in his anticipation of Banquo’s murder,
and an unwitting Lady Macbeth tries to console and compose him: “Corne on, gentie
my lord, / Sleek o’er your rugged looks. Be bright and jovial / Among your guests
tonight” (3.2.30-2). He teils her that his mmd is “full of scorpions” (3.2.41), and when
she asks him “[w]hat’s to be done,” he keeps her in the dark: “3e innocent of the
Imowiedge, dearest chuck” (3.3.50-1). This exchange involves a useless attempt on both
of their parts to restore thernselves to their former marital roles and norrnalcy. Lady
Macbeth caimot “be innocent” at Macbeth’s command, no more than Macbeth can
“give the cheer” at her request (3.4.3 7), and the futility of Lady Macbeth’s endeavor to
be woman and a wife again becomes increasingly evident. As the rest of the deadly
events in Macbeth unfold without her, Lady Macbeth retreats from the action and
becomes “unmann’d” in a folly ofher own.
By tlie time we see Lady Macbeth again, in Act 5, slie lias descended into
madness and is apparently prone to sleepwalking
— behavior which lier doctor
appropriately describes as a “great perturbation in nature” (5.1.10). She stalks the court
at night, madly wringing her hands in an effort to rid them of imaginary blood stains,
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and reliving
— and revealing in her muttering
— the horrors that she and Macbeth have
experienced:
Out, damned spot, out, I say! One. Two.
Why then, ‘tis time to do’t. Heu is murky. Fie, my
lord, fie, a soldier and afeard? What need we fear
who knows it, when none can call our power to
account? Yet who would have thought the old man
to have had so much blood in hid?...
The Thane of Fife had wife. Where is
she now? What, will these hands ne’er be clean?...
What’s done cannot be undone. To bed. (5.1.36-42, 44-5, 71)
What is obvious to the doctor and the gentiewoman who witness Lady Macbeth in this
state, is also obvious to the audience: “Unnatural deeds / Do breed unnatural troubles”
(5.2.75-6). Lady Macbeth’s daring rhetorical transgressions are both unnatural and
irreversible, and her strange and uncertain manner of death is ironically signaled
offstage by “the cry ofwomen” (5.5.10), and not a single word of ber own. Her suicide
has little effect upon the now heartless Macbeth, who generally laments that “[life] is a
tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury / Signifying nothing” (5.5.29.3 1). The
“insignificance” of Lady Macbeth’ s “sound and fury” within ber character society is
accentuated by how Young Siward is reported, in the final scene, to have died “like a
man” (5.8.48). That statement, in itself, contains perhaps the greatest irony in Macbeth,
for no matter how many men die like men, it is the fact that one Lady speaks like a man
which is the most crucial element ofthe entire play.
Isabella, Desdemona, and Lady Macbeth together demonstrate a consequential
generic trajectory for the rhetorical Shakespearean female. As the severity of their
misfortunes are directly proportional to the seriousness of their plays, we may conclude
that the movement from comedy into tragedy is, for the speaking woman, a passage into
$3
hostile and deadly territory. However, if we choose to consider that the tragicomic
rhetorical female
— she who embodies eloquence, femininity, and survival
— bridges the
gap between the dramatic genres, then she becomes our license to judge Shakespeare’s
more tragic females by their rhetorical identities, and flot according to the events and
outcomes of their character lives. According to the theory of rhetorical identity, the
rhetorical female is tragic only insofar as she is a victim of poor dramatic
circumstances. There is nothing inherently tragic about ber.
Conclusion I Prospectus
$5
Perhaps the simplest observation that we can make is that in the
sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness
about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful
process.
Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance $etffashioning, I 9$O
Rhetoric is iess preoccupied with distinctions, rather more unifying. It
works through the imagination... [and] schematizes what would
otherwise be too fantastic into identifiable figures of style that can be
made out to simple embeïiishments on formai signification.
Walter J. Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology, 1971
My development of this theory of rhetorical identity is partially an attempt to
revive Shakespearean character criticism in a way that authenticates it. Ibe highly
rornanticized character analyses of such great critics as Dr Sarnuel Johnson, A.C.
Bradley, and the irrepressible Harold Bloom have
— with their enthusiasm,
imagination, and articulacy
— made an important contribution to Shakespeare studies
they have also, unfortunately, given Shakespearean character criticism the reputation
of being a self-indulgent exercise in “bardolatry,” and a soapbox from which to treat
Shakespeare as a genius, and bis characters as real people who present us with
images of our own selves. Other critics have rebelled against this formalist tendency
by applying, to Shakespeare’s texts and figures, completely external theories of
literature such as those employed by postmodern psychoanalytic, deconstructionist,
Marxist. and feminist scholars. While I do not share Bloom’s grand sentiment that
Shakespeare is responsible for the “invention of the human,” I also refuse to
acknowledge any futility or decadence in formalist theory or in the practice of
Shakespearean character criticism. I personally share Northrop Frye’s original desire
and vision: to create a theory that “grow(s) out of the art it deals with” (6-7). I want
to study Shakespeare’s characters for what they actually are: the very words by
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which we identify them. That being said, I also want to ensure that any character
theory that I create and apply is flot aesthetically frozen, but firmly rooted in literary
histoty and authorial craftsmanship. That is where rhetorical theory proves itself to
be crucial, in establishing and qualifying the Shakespearean character as the product
and the embodiment of the classical “art of persuasion”
— that which was not only
widely studied and practiced in Early Modem England, but which heavily influenced
the production of neoclassical texts, including the works of Shakespeare, and thus
contributed significantly to the fashioning of character identity. I want
Shakespearean character criticism to examine Shakespeare’s figures both
aesthetically and practically — not as people, but the as exceptional works of art that
they have aiways been, and continue to be.
This thesis is a labor of love, and it is also very much a work in progress —
one that I intend to broaden and strengthen at the doctoral level in rny proposed
dissertation, Rhetorical Identity and the Enduring $hakespearean Character. At this
stage, I have examined the crucial relationship between dramatic structure and
character in its necessitation and formation of rhetorical identity — that which allows
a character to transcend and to be considered apart from its dramatic origins. for the
rhetorical female character, this methodology shifts the critical focus away from her
character’s actions and fate, and towards the image(s) that she presents of herself.
While my development of the concept of rhetorical identity has served, in this
project, to theoretically liberate the dramatically-doomed rhetorical female in
Shakespearean drama, I envision this theory as being relevant and applicable to other
complex and controversial Shakespearean figures — including his tragic heroes,
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loveable fools, and outstanding villains. I also intend for the assessment of rhetorical
identity to become a far more comprehensive and disciplined process, in which
character rhetoric is dissected and analyzed for the specific tropes and figures of
speech that it uses to influence and to entertain its intended audience.
Afier ail, my particular interest in Shakespearean character and rhetoric stems
from a wilÏ to explain the power of language to affect the imagination. Shakespeare’s
figures have an exceptional capacity to take shape and dwell in the minds of
audiences, readers and critics, and this phenomenon begs certain questions: What
gives $hakespeare’s characters their human value and cultural currency? How do
they speak to us, and why do they remain with us? My goal is, and has aiways been,
to explicitly examine the manner in which Shakespeare’s characters resist dramatic
and contextual constraints upon their speech and actions and achieve potent and
lasting identifies that extend beyond the boundaries of their plays. The theory and
methodology of rhetorical identity essentially highiights the persuasive effect that
Shakespeare’s characters have on audiences and readers, and thus encourages a
critical awareness of how they maintain their integrity over time, and persistentiy
compel our consideration.
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